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Hood: No Requirement Left Behind: The Inadvertent Discovery Requirement

Note
NO REQUIREMENT LEFT BEHIND: THE
INADVERTENT DISCOVERY
REQUIREMENT—PROTECTING CITIZENS
ONE FILE AT A TIME
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of computers came the dawn of a new age—a
Digital Age. Many take for granted the ability of computers to assist and
manage our daily lives, but few recognize that complex problems arise
through the application of historic doctrines to new technology.1 For
instance, during the government investigation of steroid use in Major
League Baseball, government officials obtained a search warrant to seize
the steroid testing results of ten specific players.2 However, in executing
Perhaps Justice Stewart said it best almost forty years ago when he aptly cautioned
that “[i]f times have changed . . . in an urban and industrial world, the changes have made
the values served by the Fourth Amendment more, not less, important.” Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971).
2
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing III),
579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162
(9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Although the Ninth Circuit revised its decision, the only
substantial change was the omission of certain language affirmatively implementing
mandatory government procedures, which instead now comprises part of a concurring
opinion. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug
Testing IV), 621 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); id. at 1178 (Kozinski, C.J.,
concurring). For this reason, citations hereinafter to the Comprehensive Drug Testing
decision will reference both en banc panel decisions, and will do so interchangeably at
times (although the Notewriter is aware the original en banc decision was ultimately
revised and superseded).
This decision has an extensive procedural history. The case was first decided in front
of a panel of three Ninth Circuit judges, and the opinion can be found at United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing I), 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006).
This panel decision was withdrawn and superseded by a second panel decision also
consisting of three judges; the opinion can be found at United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing II), 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008). This second panel
decision was ultimately withdrawn, and the case was heard en banc before eleven judges
of the Ninth Circuit. See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 993.
Because of the potentially enormous impact of the decision, the Ninth Circuit, on
November 4, 2009, ordered that both parties “file simultaneous briefs addressing whether
this case should be reheard en banc by the full court” by November 25, 2009. Order for
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., No. 05-10067 (9th Cir. Nov. 4 2009),
available at http://volokh.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/CDTOrder.pdf. On
November 23, 2009, the Department of Justice also filed an amicus brief in support of the
rehearing en banc by the full court. Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En
1
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the warrant, the officials gained access to test results of thousands of
other professional athletes from various professional sports.3 The
difficult issue the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had to resolve was whether the government should be able to keep the
information relating to the players not specified in the warrant.4
To date, only two Circuits—the Ninth and Tenth—have
comprehensively addressed the unique issues raised by searches and
seizures of computer-related or electronically stored information.5
Furthermore, district courts have been unable to agree on a coherent
understanding of how to reconcile new technology and existing
standards.6 As a result, the case law and commentary regarding the
application of constitutional doctrines to the search and seizure of
computer information is discordant.7 At worst, there is high potential
that courts will adopt misguided notions of constitutional protection and
Banc by the Full Court, Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (2009) (No. 05-10067).
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit heard the case again en banc, resulting in Comprehensive
Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162.
3
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 993. The information seized by the
government included, inter alia, the master list of all MLB players tested during the 2003
season and a list of positive drug test results for eight of the ten specified players,
intermingled with positive results for twenty-six other MLB players. Id. at 997.
4
Id. The Ninth Circuit described the case as being about “the procedures and
safeguards that federal courts must observe in issuing and administering search warrants
and subpoenas for electronically stored information.” Id. at 993.
5
See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s approach to the issue);
infra Part III.B–III.C (analyzing the positive and negative aspects of each approach). For the
purposes of this Note, the terms “computer-related,” “digital,” “electronic,” “electronically
stored,” and “magnetically stored” evidence refer to the same general category of evidence.
This evidence is generally the same as the evidence described in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as “electronically stored information.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (Notes of
Advisory Committee on 2006 Amendments) (noting that the wide variety of computer
systems currently in use and the rapid pace of technological change counsels against a
limiting or precise definition of electronically stored information). The Committee was
wise in using a term that accounts for all current methods of computer information and still
allows for technological advancements. See id. (indicating that the term electronically
stored information should encompass data “stored in any medium” and allow for future
developments in computer technology; it is a term “intended to be broad enough to cover
all current types of computer-based information, and flexible enough to encompass future
changes and developments”).
6
See infra Parts II–III (providing background and analysis of the different approaches
that circuit and district courts have taken to resolve novel issues).
7
Compare Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998 (holding that the government
should forswear use of the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases), with United States
v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that where police inadvertently
discovered child pornography during search for fake ID-related information and
subsequently applied for a second warrant, no constitutional violation occurred), and
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the subjective
intent of the officer is determinative).
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thereby compromise the privacy and possessory interests of all
Americans. To ensure that the correct balance is struck between these
two competing interests—the interest of the individual and that of the
state—courts must espouse a solution that is sensitive to the efforts of
law enforcement officials, while retaining the explicit protections
provided by the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution.8
This Note will first briefly provide a historical context of the Fourth
Amendment, presenting relevant background information, detailing its
two main requirements, and defining the terms of art within its text.9
Part II further examines existing jurisprudential theories and how they
attempt to reconcile the plain view doctrine with electronically stored
and computer-related evidence.10 Next, Part III analyzes the feasibility of
the various approaches and concludes that currently no one approach
adequately balances all of the competing interests.11 Finally, Part IV
offers a solution to the problems created by computer-related evidence
and proposes that the Supreme Court implement the inadvertent
discovery requirement of Coolidge v. New Hampshire as applied to such
evidence.12
II. BACKGROUND
Searches and seizures of computer data stored on personal
computers and within extensive computer databases will compel courts
to resolve situations in which relevant, incriminating evidence is
intermingled with highly personal and entirely unrelated information.
To date, at least one man has been sentenced to death following an
officer’s electronic recovery of incriminating notes that were previously

See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (“On one side of the balance are
arrayed the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the
other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order.”);
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1004 (“This case well illustrates both the
challenges faced by modern law enforcement in retrieving information it needs
to . . . prosecute wrongdoers, and the threat to the privacy of innocent parties from a
vigorous criminal investigation.”).
9
See infra Part II (presenting an overview of the history of the Fourth Amendment and
what it has come to require).
10
See infra Part II (examining the existing avenues that courts have taken to reconcile the
Fourth Amendment’s requirements, the plain view doctrine, and searches for electronically
stored evidence).
11
See infra Part III (analyzing the positive and negative aspects of varying approaches).
12
See infra Part IV (proposing that the Supreme Court preserve Coolidge’s inadvertent
discovery requirement as applied to digital evidence by distinguishing such evidence from
the physical evidence in Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137–38 (1990)).
8
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deleted.13 The government has also indicted a college student on felony
fraud and software piracy charges after the government monitored the
student’s website postings.14 This novel dilemma has yet to receive a
great deal of attention from courts despite its inevitable significance on
modern American life, and remains a relatively undeveloped area of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.15 However, two circuit courts
addressed the issue—one directly and one indirectly—and formulated a
special doctrine in an attempt to handle these searches and seizures.16
Part II.A of this Note provides a general background to the Fourth
Amendment, including information about its history and the motivation
for its drafting and ratification.17 Next, Part II.A.1 and Part II.A.2
examine two of the most essential requirements in Fourth Amendment
analysis: the warrant requirement and the particularity requirement,
respectively.18 Then, Part II.A.3 precisely addresses what the term
“seizure” means within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.19 Next, Part
II.B of this Note discusses the Fourth Amendment’s application to
computer evidence, the plain view doctrine (an exception to the warrant
requirement), and the differing approaches that courts have taken in an
attempt to solve the problem of applying the plain view doctrine in the
context of computer-related evidence cases.20

13
See Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353, 1356–57 (Pa. 1991) (affirming
appellant’s murder conviction and death sentence and holding, inter alia, that appellant’s
attempt to delete computer files created only a mere hope of secrecy, which was not
synonymous with a legally cognizable expectation of privacy).
14
Peter H. Lewis, Student Accused of Running Network for Pirated Software, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 9, 1994, at A1 (discussing the government’s monitoring of a college student’s
electronic bulletin board and Internet site, which ultimately resulted in a felony indictment
on fraud and software piracy charges); see also Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of
Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 77 n.11 (1994) (recounting these and
many more horror stories involving overly broad searches and seizures of computer
evidence).
15
See, e.g., United States v. Jinwoo Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 944 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (basing
almost the entire opinion off of Ninth Circuit case law because “neither the Fifth Circuit
nor the United States Supreme Court have developed precedent” and “the Ninth Circuit
has the most robust body of law on the subject matter.”).
16
See infra Part II.B.2–3 (providing a background of the Ninth and Tenth Circuit’s
differing approaches to the issue).
17
See infra Part II.A (discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment as well as general
Fourth Amendment principles).
18
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the warrant requirement); infra Part II.A.2 (discussing
the particularity requirement).
19
See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the meaning of the term “seizure” within Fourth
Amendment analysis).
20
See infra Part II.B (discussing the Fourth Amendment as applied to computers, the
plain view doctrine, and the differing approaches courts utilize to reconcile the two).
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A. The Requirements of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted by
Congress in 1789 and ratified by the states as a provision of the Bill of
Rights in 1791.21 The Fourth Amendment guards against unreasonable
searches and seizures by both federal and local law enforcement
officials.22 It was drafted and ratified to ensure that the overly intrusive
general searches conducted under English rule were not reinstated in the
new nation.23 When examining the Fourth Amendment, the interests at
21
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 724 (1999). See generally ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT: A HISTORY OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE pt. 1 (2006) (providing a
descriptive account of early Fourth Amendment history and its surrounding
circumstances).
22
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 215 (1960). The Fourth Amendment ensures that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment history indicates that it was drafted to guard
against the use of general warrants and Writs of Assistance, which were prevalent in
Colonial England. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10 (4th ed. 2008)
[hereinafter LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE]. The drafters of the Constitution considered
such broad searches to be an unreasonable intrusion of privacy that necessitated protection.
Id. The Fourth Amendment, as adopted, is both brief and ambiguous; it gives no definition
and little context to “unreasonable” and does not set forth detailed information regarding
the requisite preconditions for the proper issuance of a warrant. Id.
Further, it is beyond dispute that the Fourth Amendment, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by state officers as well as
federal officers. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646–48 (1961) (holding that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extended to the States the Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and also extended, inasmuch as necessary to
ensure such rights, the exclusionary rule); see also Elkins, 364 U.S. at 215 (recounting the
history of distinguishing between state and federal actors and discussing the ridiculous
outcome that such an analysis creates). According to the Court, no distinction can logically
be drawn between evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and that
obtained in violation of the Fourteenth. Id. Moreover, to the victim it matters not whether
his constitutional right has been invaded by a federal agent or by a state officer, for “[i]t
would be a curiously ambivalent rule that would require the courts of the United States to
differentiate between unconstitutionally seized evidence upon so arbitrary a basis. Such a
distinction indeed would appear to reflect an indefensibly selective evaluation of the
provisions of the Constitution.” Id.
23
JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1966). Our
forefathers were less concerned about warrantless searches and more concerned about the
issuance of overreaching and overbroad warrants. Id. The Court has noted that it is
perhaps too much to say that Colonial-Americans “feared the warrant more than the
search, but it is plain enough that the warrant was the prime object of their concern. Far
from looking at the warrant as a protection against unreasonable searches, they saw it as an
authority for unreasonable and oppressive searches.” TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDIES IN
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stake are necessarily substantial.24 Thus, the Supreme Court has
adamantly reaffirmed that, unless justified by an exception to the
warrant requirement, warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.25
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41 (1969). This Colonial struggle includes within its
ambit the controversy in England over the issuance of general warrants to aid enforcement
of the seditious libel laws and writs of assistance. See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 311 (1978) (“An important forerunner of the first [ten] Amendments to the United
States Constitution, the Virginia Bill of Rights, specifically opposed ‘general warrants . . . .’
The general warrant was a recurring point of contention in the Colonies immediately
preceding the Revolution.”); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1977) (“[T]he
Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience
with the writs of assistance . . . [that] granted sweeping power to customs officials and
other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.”). The Framers’ experience
and familiarity with the abuses that accompanied the issuance of such general warrants
provided the principal stimulus for the restraints on arbitrary governmental intrusions
embodied in the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION 40–42 (2008) (providing a detailed account
of precisely why American colonists so detested the general warrants of English rule and
suggesting that the Fourth Amendment was drafted almost entirely to prevent its
reoccurrence is the newly formed United States). Clancy also contends that the warrant
was the “initial and primary object” of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 40 n.98. See generally
TAYLOR, supra, at 43 (noting that the history and drafting process of the Fourth Amendment
strongly suggest that the warrant was the preeminent object of the amendment).
24
See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314–15 (1972) (specially
noting the importance of the government and that of the individual). The Court noted that
because the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, it requires a court to examine
and balance the basic values at stake in each case—the government’s duty to protect
domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance into
individual privacy and free expression. Id.
25
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In Katz, the Court noted that it is a
well-established doctrine that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” Id. (footnote omitted). The Court has been sure to reaffirm this basic principle
whenever the occasion arises. See Warden Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298–300 (1967) (reiterating that absent exigent circumstances searches without a warrant
are unreasonable per se); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59–62 (1967) (same); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 486–87 (1964) (same); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613–
15 (1961) (same); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960) (same); Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 497–99 (1958) (same); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174–77
(1949) (same); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454–56 (1948) (same); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 (1925) (same). Many exceptions to the warrant
requirement have developed over the years, but have been, in theory, narrowly tailored
and jealously drawn. See generally Theodore P. Metzler et al., Thirtieth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 89 GEO. L.J. 1084 (2001) (providing a
detailed compilation and analysis of warrantless search and seizure jurisprudence). These
exceptions include, but are not limited to
investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a
valid arrest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances,
consent searches, vehicle searches, container searches, inventory
searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and
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Further, the Court has stressed that all searches should proceed only
after issuance of a warrant by a neutral and detached magistrate.26 To be
sure, the Fourth Amendment has two separate and interrelated clauses
that coexist to protect citizens from unwarranted governmental
intrusion: the “Reasonableness Clause” and the “Warrant Clause.”27
The Court has been careful to note that although the Fourth Amendment
speaks broadly of unreasonable searches and seizures, the definition of
“reasonableness” turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands
of the Warrant Clause.28
searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the
probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable.
Id. at 1084. Other more circumscribed exceptions include warrants to search “pervasively
regulated business[es].” United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972). This also includes
warrants to search closely regulated industries “long subject to close supervision and
inspection.” Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970). One lower
court has actually created an explicit list of exceptions to the warrant requirement. See
State v. Lara, 797 P.2d 296, 303 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that warrantless searches are
permissible only if they fall within one of the following narrowly drawn exceptions to the
warrant requirements: “(1) plain view; (2) probable cause [accompanied by] exigent
circumstances; (3) search incident to lawful arrest; (4) consent; (5) hot pursuit; and
(6) inventory searches” (citing State v. Ruffino, 612 P.2d 1311 (1980))).
26
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). The Fourth Amendment’s
protection consists in requiring that inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime. Id.; see also Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212
(1981) (explaining that warrants are necessary because law enforcement “may lack
sufficient objectivity to weigh correctly the strength of the evidence supporting the
contemplated action”). For instance, in Coolidge, the defendant was charged with murder
and the chief investigator (and eventual prosecuting attorney), acting in his capacity as
justice of the peace, issued a search warrant for defendant’s automobile. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971). The Court found that the seizure and search of the
automobile could not constitutionally rest upon the warrant issued by the state official who
was not the “neutral and detached magistrate” required by the Constitution because the
individual who issued the warrant was also the individual pursuing the case; therefore, the
chief investigator/prosecuting attorney lacked the “neutral and detached” quality that is
required by the Fourth Amendment. Id. (quoting Jackson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–
14 (1948)).
27
See Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 302 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to
the text of the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment); see also Kelly A. Borchers, Note,
Mission Impossible: Applying Arcane Fourth Amendment Precedent to Advanced Cellular Phones,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 223, 230–31 (2005) (detailing the two clauses of the Fourth Amendment
and discussing the interplay between their distinct mandates and implications).
28
Keith, 407 U.S. at 314–15. This includes the fact that a warrant must be reasonable at
the time it is issued. Id. In Chimel v. California, the Court considered the Government’s
contention that the search be judged on a general “reasonableness” standard without
reference to the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. 395 U.S. 752, 764–65 (1969). The
Court concluded that such an argument was “founded on little more than a subjective view
regarding the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations
relevant to Fourth Amendment interests.” Id. The Court was deeply concerned that
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The initial clause of the Fourth Amendment is known as the
“Reasonableness Clause” and has been understood to state a
comprehensive principle—the government shall not violate the “right to
be secure” by conducting “unreasonable” searches and seizures.29 This
portion of the Amendment explains who and what the Fourth
Amendment envelopes (i.e., protection of “the people” and their
“persons, houses, papers, and effects”).30 The latter portion of the
Amendment is known as the “Warrant Clause” because it relates
specifically to warrants and explains what a court requires before it
issues a warrant.31
1.

The Warrant Requirement

The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment contains two
separate and independent standards: (1) there must be probable cause
for the warrant to be issued, and (2) the warrant must particularly
“[u]nder such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment protection in this area would
approach the evaporation point.” Id. at 765. The Court has also noted that the warrant
requirement is far from superfluous language and has reiterated its value as a part of our
constitutional law for decades. Keith, 407 U.S. at 315–16; Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481. It has
emphatically noted that the warrant requirement is not a mere “inconvenience to be
somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.” Keith, 407 U.S. at 315 (quoting
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481). “It is, or should be, an important working part of our machinery
of government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but
mistakenly over-zealous executive officers’ . . . of law enforcement.” Id. at 315–16 (quoting
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 481).
29
Davies, supra note 21, at 557, 574. Numerous commentaries discuss the fundamental
meanings of the Fourth Amendment clauses, the interplay between them, and the inherent
difficulties that arise when attempting to reconcile them. Id. For a more in-depth
discussion, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT 5–7 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter LAFAVE, TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT] (discussing the interaction between these two Fourth Amendment clauses).
30
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 6.01 (3d ed. 2002).
31
See Borchers, supra note 27 (providing analysis as to how the Warrant and
Reasonableness Clauses relate to one another). The Warrant Clause requires that warrants
should only be issued upon “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation” and that
the warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)
(quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973)) (finding that although
in certain limited circumstances a warrant is not required, “[t]he fundamental command of
the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and . . . the
requirement of a warrant bear[s] on the reasonableness of a search”); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 86 (1967) (holding that searches and seizures are presumptively
unconstitutional unless conducted pursuant to a valid warrant). In Steele v. United States,
the Court held that a warrant should describe the places to be searched and objects to be
seized with sufficient particularity so as to leave nothing to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant. 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925).
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describe who or what is to be seized.32 Initially, probable cause is an
objective concept that attempts to circumscribe the power of the
government in obtaining warrants by requiring, at minimum, a loose
nexus between the alleged criminal activity, the items to be seized, and
the place to be searched.33 The second requirement—the particularity
requirement—provides that the warrant describe the places to be
searched and objects to be seized with sufficient particularity so that
officers may “with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place [or
object] intended.”34 The degree of specificity required will vary with the
specific facts of the case; nonetheless, the Supreme Court resolutely
Steele, 267 U.S. at 503; see also infra Part II.A.2 (providing an in-depth discussion of the
particularity requirement).
33
See generally Steele, 267 U.S. at 499–502 (recounting painstakingly the process by which
an official obtains a warrant for probable cause). Probable cause is viewed as a static
concept due to its objective nature. Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81
TEX. L. REV. 951, 954–56 (2003). Thus, no amount of subjective belief on behalf of law
enforcement is sufficient to meet the standards of probable cause; there must exist
“objective probable cause.” DRESSLER, supra note 30, § 9.02; see also Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that a law enforcement official’s motives are not a factor
when determining probable cause but are a factor when determining the reasonableness of
a search, the extent of a search, or the manner in which a search was conducted). For the
purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the probable cause requirement has been met.
Probable cause is considerably less of an issue in the context of Fourth Amendment cases
involving the search and seizure of computer or digital evidence.
34
Steele, 267 U.S. at 503; see also, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 150 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir.
1998) (finding warrant sufficiently particular even though it contained directions that
omitted the final turn because the surrounding property did not fit description of house in
warrant); United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243, 249 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding warrant
sufficiently particular although the first floor was not listed because affidavit supported
conclusion that all three floors were under control of the target of the warrant); United
States v. Gilliam, 975 F.2d 1050, 1055 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding warrant sufficiently particular
although it contained an erroneous description of one of the farm’s boundaries because the
warrant contained information that targeted the only farm in the vicinity and was thus
sufficiently particular to avoid the risk of searching the wrong property); United States v.
Dancy, 947 F.2d 1232, 1234 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding warrant sufficiently particular where it
merely contained the correct street address). But see, e.g., Bartholomew v. Pennsylvania,
221 F.3d 425, 426 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding warrant insufficiently particular where it did not
state items to be seized because attached exhibit listing items was sealed); United States v.
Shamaeizadeh, 80 F.3d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding warrant insufficiently particular
because officers had actual notice that the house was divided into two apartments prior to
conducting search, yet failed to list the basement apartment); United States v. Dahlman, 13
F.3d 1391, 1395–96 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding warrant insufficiently particular because
location was identified by only two lot numbers within subdivision and without reference
to structures on property); United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701, 703–04 (11th Cir. 1992)
(finding warrant insufficiently particular because it lacked a physical description of the
premises, merely identifying it as the “third mobile home on the north side”); United States
v. Nafzger, 965 F.2d 213, 215–16 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (finding warrant insufficiently
particular because it identified locus of the search for a truck as “Western District of
Wisconsin”).
32
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advocates that officers must procure a warrant before conducting a
search or seizure.35
2.

The Particularity Requirement

The particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment serves two
major functions: (1) it informs the officers of what they are allowed to
lawfully search and seize, and (2) it notifies the person who is being
searched or seized of what the officers are lawfully allowed to take.36
The particularity requirement is especially important in the context of
digital evidence because it demarcates the boundaries of a given search.37
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (noting that the necessity of
drawing Fourth Amendment exceptions as narrowly as possible “may appear unrealistic or
‘extravagant’ to some. But the values were those of the authors of our fundamental
constitutional concepts,” and that “[i]n times not altogether unlike our own [our
forefathers] won . . . a right of personal security against arbitrary [invasions] by official
power”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasizing that the most basic
constitutional norm in this area is “that searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment” and that such exceptions are jealously and carefully drawn); Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 303–04 (1921) (“It would not be possible to add to the emphasis
with which the framers of our Constitution and this court have declared the
importance . . . of the due observance of the rights guaranteed under the Constitution by
[the Fourth Amendment].” (citations omitted)).
36
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (holding that particular warrants
ensure that the target of the search or seizure is aware of what police may search, their
reasons for doing so, and the appropriate limits to the search); Hon. Robert H. Bohn, Jr. &
Lynn S. Muster, The Dawn of the Computer Age: How the Fourth Amendment Applies to
Warrant Searches and Seizures of Electronically Stored Information, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 63, 65 (2003). A particular warrant also informs the individual subject to the search
or seizure “of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits
of his power to search.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 561 (2004) (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S.
at 9). This also acts as a check on the administrative arm of the government. See Maryland
v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“By limiting the authorization to search to the specific
areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that
the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of
the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.”).
37
United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759 (2d Cir. 1984). A warrant is sufficiently
particular if it “enable[s] the executing officer to ascertain and identify with reasonable
certainty those items that the magistrate has authorized him to seize.” United States v.
George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1992).
Courts tend to tolerate a greater degree of ambiguity where law
enforcement agents have done the best that could reasonably be
expected under the circumstances, have acquired all the descriptive
facts which a reasonable investigation could be expected to cover, and
have insured that all those facts were included in the warrant.
United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Young, 745 F.2d at 759); see
also United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Warrants which describe
generic categories of items are not necessarily invalid if a more precise description of the
35
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The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the interests served by
the requirement suggest that it should be somewhat flexible and
malleable, requiring reasonable specificity.38 In Katz v. United States, the
Court determined that no discretion should be left to the executing
officers; thus, even if officers act with restraint, the warrant may be
found unconstitutional because the restraint is to be imposed by a
neutral and detached magistrate rather than law enforcement officials.39
items subject to seizure is not possible.”). However, “[a] failure to describe the items to be
seized with as much particularity as the circumstances reasonably allow offends the Fourth
Amendment because there is no assurance that the permitted invasion of a suspect’s
privacy and property are no more than absolutely necessary.” George, 975 F.2d at 76.
38
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); Hon. Bohn, Jr. & Muster, supra note 36, at
65 (2003); see also Steele, 267 U.S. at 503 (stating that the place to be searched must be
described to such an extent that an officer can identify it by using only reasonable effort).
Thus it is sufficiently particular to simply state the street address of a house that is to be
searched, but more may be required if the location is a multi-unit complex. See Garrison,
480 U.S. at 80–81 (finding that where a search warrant specified the location of the search as
“the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third floor apartment” and two apartments
actually existed at such address, the search warrant was not held invalid because officers
“reasonably concluded that there was only one apartment on the third floor” based on
objective facts). The Supreme Court has found that the interests served by the particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment are “to prevent general searches, to prevent the
seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another, and to prevent warrants from
being issued on vague or dubious information.” Groh, 540 U.S. at 560; see also Coolidge, 403
U.S. at 467 (noting that the particularity requirement protects against “general, exploratory
rummaging in a person’s belongings”). Generally, warrants are found to be insufficiently
particular where “[n]othing on the face of the warrant tells the searching officers for what
crime the search is being undertaken.” George, 975 F.2d at 76; see also United States v.
Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding warrant lacked particularity where it did
not describe “the possible crimes involved”); United States v. Hickey, 16 F. Supp. 2d 223,
240 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (invalidating several warrants on particularity grounds where “none
identified the nature of the suspected wrongdoing triggering the searches”); Roberts v.
United States, 656 F. Supp. 929, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding warrant insufficiently
particular where, among other omissions, the warrant contained “no restriction to any
specific wrongful transaction to which the documents were related”), rev'd on other grounds,
852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988).
39
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 356 (holding that antecedent judicial authorization, not given in
the instant case, was a constitutional precondition of the kind of electronic surveillance
involved). The Court in Katz took the opportunity again to stress that “[s]earches
conducted without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts
unquestionably showing probable cause,’” that the “Constitution requires . . . [‘]the
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and
the police,’” that “‘[o]ver and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the
[Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,’ and that searches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 357 (fourth alteration in original)
(citations omitted). See Groh, 540 U.S. at 560 (noting that the Warrant Clause’s main
protection is that it has “interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. . . . so
that an objective mind might weigh the need to invade [the searchee’s] privacy in order to
enforce the law” (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1998))); see also
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As well as struggling to find the right scope of particularity within
the Fourth Amendment, courts have also struggled with the exact
meaning of the terms “search” and “seizure” within the purview of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.40
3.

What Constitutes a “Seizure”?

The Court has defined a seizure as a “meaningful interference with
an individual’s possessory interests” in property.41 Thus, a seizure
occurs when an officer removes or destroys property or when she
secures the premises where property is located, because these actions
meaningfully interfere with an individual’s property rights.42 Likewise,
Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that a warrant may be valid if
it describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms and “when the description is as
specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit”
(quoting United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988))); United States v. Riley,
906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Once a category of seizable papers has been adequately
described, with the description delineated in part by an illustrative list of seizable items,
the Fourth Amendment is not violated because the officers executing the warrant must
exercise some minimal judgment . . . .”).
40
Darla W. Jackson, Protection of Privacy in the Search and Seizure of E-Mail: Is the United
States Doomed to an Orwellian Future?, 17 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 97, 100, 102 (1999); see
also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
meaning of the terms is “not remotely contained in the Constitution”); infra Part II.A.3
(discussing the precise meaning of the terms “search” and “seizure” within the context of
the Fourth Amendment).
41
Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 113 (1984)); see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708–09 (1983) (finding that
the term “seizure” signifies a meaningful interference with possessory interests or property
rights); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Chadwick, 433
U.S. at 13–14, 14 n.8 (same); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (same). Although the
concept of a “seizure” of property is actually discussed fairly infrequently by the Court, its
definition flows from “[the Court’s] oft-repeated definition of the ‘seizure’ of a person
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113 n.5. That is the
“meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual’s freedom of movement.” Id.;
see also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (finding that a seizure implicates a
meaningful interference with possessory or property interests); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438, 440 (1980) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551–54
(1980) (Stewart, J.) (same); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979) (same); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (same); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 294–95
(1973) (same); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726–27 (1969) (same); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 16, 19 n.16 (1968) (same).
42
See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 60 (1992) (holding that, where a landlord
chose to forcibly evict a tenant two weeks prior to the scheduled eviction hearing by
removing and selling the tenants’ trailer, the seizure of the trailer implicated the tenant’s
privacy and liberty interests that were protected under the Fourth Amendment because the
eviction involved sufficient state action); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 120–21 (holding that a seizure
resulted where federal agents exhibited dominion over a white powdery substance found
in the innermost of a series of four plastic bags that had also been concealed in a tube inside
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due to a similar lack of interference, a seizure does not occur when an
officer merely picks up and immediately sets down an object.43
In United States v. Jacobsen, for instance, Federal Express employees,
while inspecting a package that was damaged and torn by a forklift,
encountered tubes containing plastic bags with white powder; they
promptly returned the contents of the tube and notified the Drug
Enforcement Administration.44 Upon arrival, a federal agent noticed the
box, now re-wrapped, on the table with a hole; he removed the plastic
bags from within and conducted a field test on the substance.45 The
Court held that the officer’s “assertion of dominion and control over the
package and its contents” qualified as a “seizure” for Fourth
Amendment purposes.46 Conversely, in Arizona v. Hicks, where the
investigating officers moved stereo equipment to view the serial number
underneath, the Court held that no seizure occurred because the slight
movement did not meaningfully affect the individual’s possessory
interests.47 Thus, the Supreme Court has devised a logical and workable

of a damaged package, but nonetheless allowing the warrantless seizure because it was not
unreasonable); Place, 462 U.S. at 707–09 (holding that officials’ conduct constituted a
“seizure” of traveler’s luggage when, following his refusal to consent to a search, a
government agent told the traveler that he was going to take the luggage to a federal judge
to procure a search warrant); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 (holding that officer “seized” defendant
and subjected him to a “search” when he took hold of him and patted down the outer
surface of his clothing); Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the permanent taking of owner’s television set and substantial damage to her
couch amounted to “seizure” under Fourth Amendment).
43
See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987) (holding that where an officer was
in a home pursuant to exigent circumstances—a bullet had been fired into it from the
apartment below—and the officer moved some components of stereo equipment in order
to read and record their serial numbers, a search but not a seizure had occurred for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
44
466 U.S. at 111.
45
Id. at 111–12.
46
Id. at 120. Likewise, and for the first time, the Supreme Court unanimously held that
during a traffic stop, a car and all of its occupants—not just the driver—are “seized” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007). Thus,
the concept of a “meaningful interference” applies to both meaningful interference of
property rights and the meaningful interference of the individual to move freely. See id. at
254 (noting that “[a] person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the
government’s action under the Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘ ‘by means of
physical force or show of authority,’ ’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement”
(citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991))).
47
480 U.S. at 324. The Court did, however, hold that the action taken by the officers was
a “search” within the Fourth Amendment because such actions exposed to view previously
concealed portions of the apartment and its contents, and produced a new invasion of
privacy that was unjustified by the exigent circumstance validating the initial entry. Id. at
325.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 7

1542 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

definition of what constitutes a seizure for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.48
B. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: The Plain View Exception
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, it does not expressly require the government to
obtain a warrant in order to conduct a search or seizure; nevertheless, the
Court has held that warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable unless justified by an exception.49 The rigidity with which
the bounds of such exceptions should be drawn is debatable; however, it
remains true that warrants are highly preferred.50 Nevertheless, over the
See supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of “seizure” as a
meaningful interference with the possessory interest of the individual or a meaningful
interference of the individual’s freedom of movement).
49
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also DRESSLER, supra note 30, §§ 12–
17 (providing a detailed and in-depth analysis of the jurisprudence surrounding the major
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
50
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (holding that even when justified by probable cause,
warrantless searches are unreasonable per se “subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions”). The axiom that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances is oft-repeated in Fourth Amendment cases and
is truly a cornerstone of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct.
1710, 1716 (2009) (“[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior
approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (quoting
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)); Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 810 (2009) (“[U]nder this Court’s
clearly established precedents, warrantless entries into a home are per se unreasonable
[absent] exigent circumstances.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (“To the
Fourth Amendment rule ordinarily prohibiting the warrantless entry of a person’s house as
unreasonable per se, one ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exception . . . [is] voluntary
consent . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)));
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“[A] search conducted without a
warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” (omission in original) (quoting
Katz, 389 U.S. at 357)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (“[The Court requires]
the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a warrant
before a search is made. Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the police as to
probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search.”); United States v. Jeffers,
342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (stating that “[o]nly where incident to a valid arrest, or in ‘exceptional
circumstances,’ may an exemption lie” from judicial processes required by Fourth
Amendment (citations omitted)); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (“Belief,
however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no
justification for a search of that place without a warrant.”). In order to avoid having to
address the issue, some courts interpret even arguably narrow warrant language into
broader discretionary language in the context of computer searches and seizures. See
United States v. Gleich, 293 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (D.N.D. 2003) (holding that a search of
three computers did not exceed the scope of a warrant because the warrant authorized a
search and seizure of items that could contain “photographs, pictures, visual
48
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years the Court has developed many exceptions to the warrant
requirement.51 One exception that is frequently used and has become
considerably recognized is a law enforcement official’s ability to seize an
object of apparently incriminating nature without a warrant so long as it
is in “plain view” and the official is lawfully present.52 Like “seizure,”
“plain view” is a term of art that has substantial development within
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.53
An object that is in “plain view” of a law enforcement official may be
seized without a warrant if (1) the official views the object from a lawful
representations, or videos in any form that include sexual conduct by a minor, as defined
by [state statute]”); United States v. Musson, 650 F. Supp. 525, 532 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding
narcotics agents did not exceed the scope of the warrant in seizing computer disks not
described in the warrant because “in the age of modern technology and commercial
availability of various forms of items, the warrant could not be expected to describe with
exactitude the precise form the records would take” (quoting United States v. Reyes, 798
F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1986))); People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153–54 (Colo. 2001) (holding that
laptop computers are “reasonably likely to serve as ‘containers' for writings, or the
functional equivalent of ‘written or printed material’” and therefore fell within the scope of
a warrant that authorized the search of written or printed material).
51
See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6
(1992) (providing a comprehensive list—to the extent any list can be comprehensive in this
area—and analyzing the relevant case law pertaining to the many exceptions to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment).
52
See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (enunciating, for the
first time, the Court’s interpretation of the plain view doctrine). The common thread
among “plain view” cases is that the official in question had a previous justification for an
intrusion or invasion and in the course of such he inadvertently came across a piece of
incriminating evidence. See id. at 466. According to Coolidge, the plain view doctrine
supplements the prior justification—whatever the reason—and allow for the seizure. Id.
The Court cautioned that the “original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them,” and that the
“‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” Id.
53
See id. at 464–66 (carving out the intricacies of the plain view doctrine after discussing
the similarities amongst lower court decisions and outlining the “circumstances in which
plain view has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of any
search, legal or illegal.”). The Coolidge plurality opinion, which brought the inception of the
plain view doctrine and is among the most cited cases in plain view jurisprudence, noted
that under certain circumstances the police may lawfully seize evidence in plain view
without a warrant, but that it is important to remember that “in the vast majority of cases,
any evidence seized by the police will be in plain view, at least at the moment of seizure,”
and that the most difficult aspect of the doctrine “has been to identify the circumstances in
which plain view has legal significance rather than being simply the normal concomitant of
any search, legal or illegal.” Id. at 465. The Court further recognized that the particularity
clause and the notion that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or
seizure absent exigent circumstances prohibits use of the plain view doctrine on items for
which officers have probable cause from the outset. Id. at 464–65. Consequently, the
inadvertency requirement, to Justice Stewart, is merely a shorthand reference to existing
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See id.
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vantage point; (2) the official has a right of physical access to it; and (3) it
is immediately apparent that the object is unlawful by its character or
nature.54 Importantly, the doctrine does not serve as an exception to

54
Id. at 466. Originally, the plain view exception contained the additional requirement
that the officer also come across the evidence “inadvertently.” Id. at 466–67. The Court
later trimmed this requirement from its plain view analysis. See Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 137–38 (1990) (concluding that the inadvertence requirement of the plain view
doctrine should no longer be analyzed as part of the application because it would be
surplusage). According to the Coolidge plurality opinion, the plain view doctrine is most
generally applicable when “the police have a warrant to search a given area for specified
objects, and in the course of the search [inadvertently] come across some other article of
incriminating character.” Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 465; see also Horton, 496 U.S. at 137 (noting
that “[the officer] must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself” in order to
seize evidence pursuant to the plain view exception); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1,
5–6 (1982) (noting that “[t]he ‘plain view’ exception . . . permits a law enforcement officer to
seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place
where the officer has a right to be” (citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443)). Interestingly, prior to
Horton, each and every circuit court had issued a decision that cited the inadvertent
requirement favorably. E.g., United States v. Caggiano, 899 F.2d 99, 103 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Poulos, 895 F.2d 1113, 1121 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. BarriosMoriera, 872 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1989); Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804, 826 n.30 (5th Cir.
1989); United States v. Holzman, 871 F.2d 1496, 1512 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110, 1113 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Meyer, 827 F.2d 943, 945 (3d
Cir. 1987); Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930, 935 (10th Cir. 1987); Tarantino v. Baker,
825 F.2d 772, 777 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Perry, 815 F.2d 1100, 1105 (7th Cir.
1987); United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1551 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Search
Warrant for Premises at 2125 S. Street, Northwest, Washington, D.C., 667 F.2d 117, 145
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Further, forty six of the fifty states had adopted the inadvertent discovery
requirement as a part of Fourth Amendment plain view analysis. See Horton, 496 U.S. at
145 n.2 (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J., dissenting) (collecting cases) (“Only three States—
California, Idaho, and Utah—have rejected the inadvertent discovery requirement.”). It is
also interesting to note that California and Idaho are located within the Ninth Circuit, and
Utah is within the Tenth Circuit—both having since adopted a view very similar to the
inadvertent discovery requirement when the doctrine is applied to computer searches and
seizures. See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(holding that the government should completely forswear use of the plain view doctrine or
any similar doctrine in the context of computer-based evidence cases), revised and superseded
per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268,
1275 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999) (implementing a “special approach” that inquires as to the
subjective intent of the officer at the time of the plain view sighting). Moreover, even the
courts that have not adopted the inadvertent discovery requirement have concluded that
the government may not engage in pretextual searches—a concept intimately related to
inadvertent discovery. See State v. Bussard, 760 P.2d 1197, 1204 n.2 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988)
(holding that an officer who enters area pursuant to a warrant to search for evidence of one
crime when he is really interested only in seizing evidence relating to another crime for
which he does not have a warrant, has engaged in a “pretextual” search and the fruits of
that search should be suppressed); State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385, 389 n.1 (Utah 1986) (holding
the same).
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Fourth Amendment searches but rather serves to justify seizures of
incriminating evidence that is in plain view.55
The initial requirement for the seizure of evidence in plain view is
that the officer must be lawfully present when she views the evidence.56
Most evidence seized pursuant to the plain view doctrine is seized either
(1) during the execution of a valid search warrant, or (2) during a search
justified by an exception to the warrant requirement.57 The second
requirement under plain view analysis requires that the official have a
lawful right of access to the object.58 The third and final requirement is
55
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466 (noting that “[t]he doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification . . . and permits the warrantless seizure”). The Court was careful to note,
however, that the extension of the prior justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them. Id. The plain
view doctrine, according to the Court, cannot be used “to extend a general exploratory
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” Id.
56
Horton, 496 U.S. at 136.
57
Id. at 135. Suppose, for instance, that police obtain a valid warrant to search
defendant’s home based on probable cause that she was involved in a homicide, and
therein they find marijuana strewn across the coffee table. The plain view doctrine would
allow the seizure of the marijuana—although a strict reading of the Fourth Amendment
would not allow it—because the amendment recognizes that the delay, inconvenience, and
risk of destruction of evidence require the procurement of a warrant. See BLOOM & BRODIN,
supra note 51, § 6.8 (1992) (providing essentially the same hypothetical example). The
officer is allowed to seize the contraband without obtaining a warrant because, among
other things, she was lawfully present pursuant to a valid search warrant, which satisfies
the first prong of the plain view inquiry. See id. Suppose instead that the police did not
have a valid warrant to search the home, but the defendant consented to their entry and
they subsequently found the drugs. The police could likewise seize the evidence because
they were lawfully present pursuant to a well recognized exception to the warrant
requirement—consent. See id. Suppose now, however, that the searching officers do not
enter the house pursuant to a valid warrant or exception to the warrant requirement, but
are merely conducting their routine foot patrol of the neighborhood when they observe the
marijuana lying on the coffee table through an open window. The officers would not be
able to enter the home and seize the contraband absent a warrant because the plain view
requirement will only authorize the seizure after the officers have lawfully entered the
premises. See id. The plain view doctrine will not provide the justification for the initial
entry upon the premises. Id.
58
BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 51, § 6.8. Bloom and Brodin also state that this
requirement mandates that the object be “observed while the officer is confining her
activities to the permissible scope of [the initial] intrusion.” Id.; see also Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
468 (noting that even where the evidence is in plain view, the “Court has repeatedly stated
and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter [private premises] and make a
warrantless seizure”). In Washington v. Chrisman, a police officer arrested the defendant for
possessing alcohol as a minor and asked for his identification. 455 U.S. at 3. The defendant
responded that his identification was in his room but that the officer could accompany him
while he went to retrieve it. Id. As the defendant entered his dorm room to obtain his
identification, the officer leaned against the doorjam and waited. Id. at 5–7. From the
doorway the officer noticed seeds and a pipe lying on the desk inside the room, and from
his training was quite sure they were marijuana related. Id. The officer seized the evidence
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that the criminal nature of the evidence must be “immediately
apparent.”59 This third prong plays a vital role in determining whether
evidence may be seized pursuant to the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement.60 Although no longer an element of plain view
and the defendant appealed alleging that the officer had no right to access the drugs within
his room. Id. The Court held that the officer had a right to accompany the arrestee to his
room closely and keep an eye on him at all times. Id. Therefore, the Court reasoned that
because the officer was lawfully present at his vantage point (i.e., the doorway) he had a
right to seize the evidence. Id. at 9. The Court noted that this was “a classic instance of
incriminating evidence found in plain view when a police officer, for unrelated but entirely
legitimate reasons, obtains lawful access to an individual’s area of privacy,” and that “[t]he
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit seizure of evidence of criminal conduct found in
these circumstances.” Id. The dissent took a different approach, claiming that although the
officer had a right to stand in the doorway to keep an eye on the arrestee, he did not have
the same right to enter the room for the purpose of investigating his suspicion about the seeds
and pipe. Id. at 10–11 (White, J. dissenting, joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ.). The Court
expressly distinguished the officer’s right to be present in the doorway from an officer that
might have merely been passing through the hallway while the defendant’s door was open
stating “[t]he circumstances of this case distinguish it significantly from one in which an
officer, who happens to pass by chance an open doorway to a residence, observes what he
believes to be contraband inside.” Id. at 9 n.5; see also, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 585–89 (1980) (holding that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the
police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a
routine felony arrest because such an arrest was an invasion of the sanctity of the home,
absent exigent circumstances, even when it was accomplished under statutory authority
and when probable cause was present); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948)
(holding that where police smelled opium from outside a door, the warrantless arrest and
search violated the Fourth Amendment even though officers may have had probable cause
to obtain a search warrant because no exigent circumstances existed and the inconvenience
and slight delay in preparing papers and presenting the evidence to a magistrate does not
justify bypassing the warrant requirement).
59
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). In Dickerson, the Supreme Court
explained that the incriminating nature of an object is immediately apparent if police have
probable cause to believe an object in plain view is contraband. Id. To illustrate, in
Coolidge, law enforcement officials seized defendant’s car from his driveway because they
thought it might implicate him in a crime. 403 U.S. at 446. Upon a microscopic search of
the vehicle the police found incriminating evidence, but because the criminal nature of the
evidence was not “immediately apparent”—that is, the police had to employ extrinsic
means to establish the criminal nature of the evidence—the Court held the seizure to be
invalid. Id. at 472–74. Likewise, in Arizona v. Hicks, the police entered the defendant’s
apartment pursuant to a valid search warrant and while inside moved a piece of stereo
equipment to see the serial number underneath, later confirming via the number that the
equipment was stolen. 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987). The Court found the search was
unconstitutional because the serial number was not “immediately apparent” as the
equipment had to be moved before it was able to be viewed. Id.
60
See David S. Ziff, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer Searches
Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 868–70 & n.198 (2005) (discussing
the importance of the “immediately apparent” requirement in plain view analysis).
However, some courts have been willing to apply the “immediately apparent” requirement
in a less than strict manner. See, e.g., United States v. Khabeer, 410 F.3d 477, 482 (8th Cir.
2005) (allowing, under the plain view exception, receipts and identity documents beyond
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analysis, the Court once held that the evidence seized pursuant to the
plain view doctrine had to be found inadvertently.61 Regardless, it is
important to remember that the plain view exception, by itself, will never
justify an entry onto private premises.62
1.

Digital Evidence Creates Novel Difficulties

Unlike the “papers” and “effects” that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment originally contemplated, computers and other devices that
store digital evidence can hold an enormous amount of data.63
Moreover, people use computers for almost everything imaginable—
from storing videos, pictures, and personal records to corresponding
with individuals worldwide.64 Although computer and digital data is in
the scope of the warrant in a fraud case); United States v. Calle, No. 98-50377, 1999 WL
313361 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 1999) (holding travel documents admissible under the plain view
exception because the officer read the documents and saw that the dates on them were
inconsistent with defendant’s prior statements); United States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129,
1133 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding notes, bank receipts, and power of attorney found during
search for other types of documents evidencing aircraft piracy admissible under plain view
exception).
61
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 467–471 & n.26 (holding that inadvertent discovery is
necessary to plain view analysis because it is the logical manifestation of the Fourth
Amendment’s explicit constitutional protections: (1) that a magistrate’s detached probable
cause determination is mandatory, and (2) that searches and seizures deemed necessary are
as narrow and limited as possible); see also supra notes 52–54 (discussing the initial
implementation and subsequent tailoring of the inadvertent discovery requirement).
Justice Stewart’s opinion deemed that if the Court is going to allow warrantless seizures of
evidence in plain view, the inadvertent discovery requirement is a necessary limitation to
such an exception. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468. Justice Stewart concluded that the first
limitation on the doctrine is that plain view alone is never enough to justify a seizure
because absent exigent circumstances there exists no rational basis for excusing the
warrantless seizure; and, second, that the discovery of evidence must be inadvertent
because where police know in advance of the evidence and intend to seize it, they should
obtain a warrant particularly describing it. Id. at 468–69. Thus, the inadvertent discovery
requirement, according to Justice Stewart, was the logical manifestation of the warrant
requirement and the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 467–71.
62
See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469 (“[P]lain view alone is never enough to justify the
warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a corollary of the familiar principle
discussed above, that no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or
seizure absent ‘exigent circumstances.’”).
63
See United States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The risk of
exposing intimate (and innocent) correspondence to prying eyes is magnified because
‘[c]omputers . . . often contain significant intermingling of relevant documents with
documents that the government has no probable cause to seize.’” (omission in original)
(quoting United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *35 (S.D.N.Y.
2007))).
64
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(“Electronic storage and transmission of data is no longer a peculiarity or luxury of the
very rich; it’s a way of life.”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010)
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some ways comparable to traditional physical evidence, inherent
differences make any straight-forward comparison troubling.65 The
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, suggested
that the problem is stated quite simply as follows: “There is no way to
be sure exactly what an electronic file contains without somehow
examining its contents—either by opening it and looking, using
specialized forensic software, keyword searching or some other such
technique.”66 Further, relevant electronic files are stored on media along
with, at times, millions of other files.67 By necessity, then, government
efforts to locate particular evidence will require examination of many
irrelevant files to ensure that the desired data is not overlooked or
hidden.68
Some courts have likened computers to file cabinets or other closed
containers and applied existing Fourth Amendment case law to
(en banc); United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Computers are
simultaneously file cabinets . . . and locked desk drawers; they can be repositories
of . . . deeply personal information, but also of evidence of crimes. . . . As society grows
ever more reliant on computers . . . courts will be called upon to analyze novel legal issues
and develop new rules within . . . Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.”).
65
See United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Because computers can
hold so much information touching on many different areas of a person’s life, there is a
greater potential for the ‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy
when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.”); United States v. Hunter, 13 F.
Supp. 2d 574, 583 (D. Vt. 1998) (“With their unparalleled ability to store and process
information, computers are increasingly relied upon by individuals in their work and
personal lives. Computer searches present [similar problems]—the intermingling of
relevant and irrelevant material—but to a heightened degree.”); see also Orin S. Kerr, Digital
Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 280 (2005) (arguing that
new dynamics of computer crime should result in the creation of new doctrines that
“impose some new restrictions on police conduct”).
66
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1004; see also Walser, 275 F.3d at 986 (“The
advent of the electronic age and . . . the development of desktop computers that are able to
hold the equivalent of a library’s worth of information, go beyond the established
categories of constitutional doctrine. Analogies to other physical objects, such as dressers
or file cabinets, do not often inform the situations we now face as judges when applying
search and seizure law.”). Commentators have likened computer files to storage containers
and plastic bags and suggested that requiring the police to rely on the file names is similar
to requiring police to rely on a plastic bag labeled “talcum powder” or “flour.” See Thomas
K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and
a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 207–10 (2005–06) (citing United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d
1081, 190–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004)).
67
See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, Chicago, Illinois 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (“Even a modest home computer today frequently has 512 megabytes of
memory (if not more), which translates into capacity of 256,000 pages of information.”).
68
See United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005) (discussing the
problems with ex ante search protocols for searching computers and noting that “[g]iven
the numerous ways information is stored on a computer, openly and surreptitiously, a
search can be as much an art as a science”).
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determine whether the police lawfully seized evidence related to the
warrant.69 Others have suggested a special approach is necessary and
that a judge or magistrate should become heavily involved in the scope
of the warrant, describing with the utmost detail precisely which files
should be searched and, to some extent, how to go about searching
them.70 These two approaches have emerged as the leading views as to
how the plain view doctrine should apply in computer evidence cases.71
2.

The Ninth Circuit’s Direct “Special Approach”

In United States v. Tamura, the Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue
of how to handle the search and seizure of intermingled physical files—a
concept intimately related to computer evidence searches.72 The court
69
For the purpose of this Note, this will be referred to as the “container theory” or
“container approach.” Courts adhering to this approach have generally looked to
traditional Fourth Amendment principles—such as probable cause and particularity—in
limiting the scope of a particular search or seizure. See United States v. Gleich, 293 F. Supp.
2d 1082, 1088 (D.N.D. 2003), aff’d, 397 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that the warrant
authorizing search of computer for photographs, pictures, visual representations, or videos
that included sexual conduct by a minor, as defined by the state statute, met the
particularity requirement and also finding that the warrant authorizing the search of the
home permitted a search of all three computers in the house); United States v. Campos, 221
F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 2000) (finding warrant sufficiently particular when it
authorized, among other things, seizure of computer equipment that may have been used
to depict or distribute child pornography); United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st
Cir. 1999) (upholding a warrant issued for “[a]ny and all computer software and
hardware, . . . computer disks, disk drives” in the home of a woman suspected of child
pornography (omissions in original)); United States v. Hall, 142 F.3d 988, 996–99 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding that the particularity requirement was satisfied when items listed in a
warrant qualified that the items sought were related to child pornography); State v. Wible,
51 P.3d 830, 837 (Wash Ct. App. 2002) (finding that a warrant was sufficiently particular
when it limited the search to images of children engaged in sexually explicit activity as
defined by state statute).
70
See infra Part II.B.2–3 (discussing the special approaches to the plain view exception as
applied to computer evidence cases, as well as the closed-container analogy and other
various theories).
71
See United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 943–49 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (recognizing that
“neither the Fifth Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court have developed precedent
specifically addressing the scope of a search for digital evidence,” and that “the Ninth
Circuit has the most robust body of law on the subject matter,” and subsequently
examining—in distinct and separate sections of the opinion—the approach that the Ninth
and Tenth Circuits have taken to reconcile plain view analysis with digital evidence); see
also infra Part III.B–C (discussing the positive and negative aspects of each of the
approaches).
72
694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). In Tamura, the defendant was involved in a bribery
scandal and officers entered Tamura’s business subject to a warrant that authorized them
to find and seize various business records. Id. at 594. The police were permitted to seize
the following: (1) records of contracts for the sale of cable during a four and one-half year
period, (2) records of payments during the same four and one-half year period, and
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began by noting that while all items in a set of files may be inspected
during a search—provided the warrant offers sufficiently specific
guidelines for identifying the relevant documents—a wholesale seizure
of all relevant documents is considerably more intrusive.73 The court
(1) determined that a valid search warrant described all of the seized
documents introduced at trial; (2) noted that in the future, when dealing
with documents that are so intermingled they cannot feasibly be sorted
on site, the government should seek the judgment of a neutral and
detached magistrate; and (3) stated that the government “generally can
(3) records of travel for a similar time period. Id. When the original means of collecting
data became overly burdensome, the employees of the company refused to cooperate, and
the agents confiscated all of the records for the time period in question regardless of their
relevance. Id. at 595. To find the relevant records in the accounting department, the agents
had to perform three steps: (1) review a computer printout; (2) locate the voucher that
corresponded to a particular payment recorded on the printout; and (3) find the check that
corresponded to the voucher. Id. at 594–95. In all, the officials seized eleven cardboard
boxes of computer printouts, which were bound in 2000-page volumes; thirty-four file
drawers of vouchers, also bound in 2000-page volumes; and seventeen drawers of
cancelled checks, which were bundled into files. Id. The agents hauled all these records to
another location, where they sifted through them and extracted the relevant documents. Id.
The defendant did not contest the validity of the search warrant; he challenged only the
scope of the seizure. Id. Notably, when the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Andresen
v. Maryland, the Court held that inevitably “innocuous” documents can be “cursorily”
examined. 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). Other courts have set forth guidelines for
governmental review of commingled records to find documents that fall within the scope
of a warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (allowing
for a “brief perusal” of each document, and requiring that “the perusal must cease at the
point at which the warrant’s inapplicability to each document is clear”); see also United
States v. Rude, 88 F.3d 1538, 1551–53 (9th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that officers may “peruse
each document to determine whether it relate[s] to other fraudulent activity,” but finding
that where it was “readily apparent” that certain documents were beyond the scope of the
warrant and agents were “immediately alerted” to that fact, the Fourth Amendment was
likely violated); United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that
“the police may look through . . . file cabinets, files and similar items and briefly peruse
their contents to determine whether they are among the documentary items to be seized”);
United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 604 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding government agents did
not act unlawfully where they “merely examined documents . . . to determine if the
documents might in some manner relate to [certain] transactions” that were described in
the warrant); United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1257 n.8 (2d. Cir. 1979) (holding valid
government action described as “some perusal, generally fairly brief”). If a document falls
outside the warrant but nonetheless is incriminating, the Heldt theory allows that
document’s “seizure” only if during that brief perusal the document’s “otherwise
incriminating character becomes obvious.” Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1267.
73
Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595. The court also noted that an indiscriminate seizure does not
comply with the Fourth Amendment especially when files are not timely returned once
segregated. Id. To summarize Tamura, the government was attempting to search for a
single document hidden somewhere in many boxes of documents. Id. at 596. Rather than
search through the boxes and seize only the one document, investigators carted off all the
documents to search them off-site at a later time. Id. at 596–97.
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avoid violating [F]ourth [A]mendment rights by sealing and holding the
documents pending approval by a magistrate of a further search.”74 The
Ninth Circuit ultimately enunciated a two prong analysis to solve the
problem of intermingled documents: (1) the government should be
allowed to seize all intermingled documents, regardless of relevance, in
order to remove them from the suspect’s control; and (2) the government
should then be required to appear before a neutral and detached
magistrate who can issue a second warrant that sets the conditions and
limits of the file search.75
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit was also the first—and, as of the date of
this Note, the only—circuit to directly consider the application of the
plain view doctrine specifically in the context of computer evidence cases
in United States v. Wong.76 In Wong, a Ninth Circuit panel determined
74
Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d 1085, 1107 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Tamura, 694
F.2d at 595–96).
75
Tamura, 694 F.2d at 591. The Tamura court’s proposed solution to the intermingled
document problem essentially had two elements. Id. at 596. First, officers should be
allowed to seize all the intermingled documents in question—regardless of relevance—thus
removing them from the defendant’s control. Id. Then, after the initial seizure, the
government should be required to go before a neutral and detached magistrate who would
issue a second warrant and determine the “conditions and limitations” for inspecting the
large quantities of computer data. Id. at 597 n.3.
76
334 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 2003). In Wong, the defendant called police and notified them
that his live-in girlfriend had been missing for several days. Id. at 833–34. Wong initially
told police that he and Sin were married, when in fact, they were not. Id. Sin was pregnant
at the time of her disappearance, a fact Wong did not tell police until days after he reported
her missing. Id. Investigating officers discovered Sin’s car a half-mile from Wong’s home,
ascertained that Wong and Sin had been fighting prior to her disappearance, found a
handgun during a consensual search of Wong’s home, and learned that shortly after Sin’s
disappearance Wong’s other girlfriend and mother of his child, Jennifer, had moved into
the house with Wong. Id. Police ultimately discovered Sin’s body in Nevada with four
bullet holes in it, as well as bullet casings that appeared to match the gun found in Wong’s
home and monopoly money marked with “NWO” and “ZOG” (letters commonly used by
white supremacy groups) next to it. Id. at 834. Upon discovering this information, police
officials presented to the magistrate judge a search warrant, affidavit, and statement of
probable cause to search Wong’s house, cars, and computer. Id. The search warrant
limited the seizure to items used to commit a felony, evidence that tended to show a felony
had been committed, or evidence that a particular person committed the felony, and also
specified that officers would be looking for any effects containing information about the
white supremacist letters or the county in Nevada where the body was found, and any
other effects belonging to Sin. Id. The warrant issued, and the police collected many
things, including the computers. Id. A special agent was called in to gather information
from the computers; he determined that information regarding the firearms, felonies, the
white supremacist letters, and the county in Nevada could be located by searching plain
text, special text, or graphics files. Id. at 835. In particular, the specialist thought that maps
of the county in Nevada, and depictions of Monopoly money and the white supremacist
letters, might be found on the computer and those would likely be found in graphic files.
Id. After the specialist began his search, he located graphic files containing child

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 7

1552 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

that a search warrant was sufficiently particular and was supported by
probable cause; however, as the court noted, the government still had to
establish the requisite elements of the plain view doctrine.77 Because the
computer specialist determined the items listed in the search warrant
could be located in plain text, special text, or graphic files on the
computer, and because the police found the child pornography files
while searching for evidence of the homicide, the court found that the
police were lawfully present at their vantage point.78
The Ninth Circuit recently had a chance to refine its position as to
how the plain view exception should apply in computer-based evidence
cases, as well as how the intermingled documents problem might best be
solved in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.79
In
Comprehensive Drug Testing, the government obtained a search warrant to
search the computer files of Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., for the
names and test results of ten specified major league baseball players.80
pornography; he made note of their location and continued his search for evidence relating
to the homicide. Id. In addition to searching the house and the car, one item on the
warrant sought to search Wong’s computers, their components, and disks to “obtain data
as it relates to this case.” Id. at 834. Specifically, the warrant list included any writings,
documents, maps, or receipts depicting or relating to Churchill County, Nevada; and
“[a]ny and all identification and documents belonging to [the murder victim].” Id. at 837.
77
Id. at 838. The Ninth Circuit panel further recognized that in order “[t]o satisfy the
plain view doctrine: (1) the officer must be lawfully in the place where the seized item was
in plain view; (2) the item’s incriminating nature was ‘immediately apparent’; and (3) the
officer had ‘a lawful right of access to the object itself.’” Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)). The Wong court found that, pursuant to a valid search warrant,
the officer had determined the items listed in the search warrant that could be located on
computer files could be found in plain text, special text, or graphic files. Id. While
searching the graphics files for evidence of murder, as allowed by the warrant, the officer
discovered pictures of children as young as age three engaged in sexual acts. Id. The
incriminating nature of the files was immediately apparent to the officer. Id. Because the
police were lawfully searching for evidence of murder in the graphics files and
inadvertently located the incriminating child pornography, the evidence was properly
admitted under the plain view doctrine. Id. at 838–39.
78
Id. The court also found that the incriminating nature of the files was immediately
apparent to the specialist since they depicted children as young as three engaged in sexual
acts; therefore, the court concluded that the evidence was properly admitted under the
plain view doctrine. Id. at 839.
79
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and
superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
80
Id. at 993–94. The warrant had an introduction that painstakingly chronicled the need
for the government to search all of the files because of the tendency of wrongdoers to
attempt to disguise and hide files, or even set up booby-traps that will destroy the
information if triggered. Id. at 1002. Therefore, the government claimed they needed to sift
through each of the files independently and prudently. Id. at 1003–06. The court aptly
recognized, however, that this will be the case in all digital and computer evidence cases,
and held that in the future the government must disclose the actual possibility of these
dangers as opposed to the ever-present danger in the abstract. Id. at 1006. Many of the
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During the search of the computers, the government arguably violated
certain terms of the search warrant by “perus[ing]” through all of the
computer files of the company without regard for whether the files
pertained to the ten specified players.81 The government argued that it
complied with the standard set forth in Tamura, but it was not required
to return the additional evidence because it was obtained “in plain
view.”82
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that the government acted
with callous disregard for the warrant requirements issued by the
magistrate by browsing all of the computers files and set out a series of
guidelines that should be used in subsequent digital evidence cases.83
The en banc court reasoned that Tamura imported procedures to
maintain “privacy of materials that are intermingled with seizable
materials, and to avoid turning a limited search . . . into a general
search.”84 The court suggested that warrants should contain language or
judges in the lower courts of this case indicated that they felt exceedingly misled by the
government’s actions. Id. at 1005–06. For instance, one of the judges issuing a warrant
asked “what ever happened to the Fourth Amendment? Was it . . . repealed somehow?”
Id. at 1005.
81
Id. at 999. The Major League Baseball Players Association agreed that players would
submit urine samples solely for determining the percentage of positive results; all results
were to remain confidential. Id. But when ten players tested positive, the government
obtained warrants and issued subpoenas to obtain information from private entities who
collected the samples and information. Id. at 997. The warrants were limited to
information on the ten players, but the government seized information on many others,
including athletes from other professional sports. Id. at 998. The government also issued
subpoenas for the same information. Id. The lower courts granted the players’ motions to
quash and to return seized property. Id. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, determined
that the government was not able to rely on the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine
to justify the seizure of the information. Id. at 999.
82
Id. at 997. A panel of the Ninth Circuit decided the case initially and ruled that the
government lawfully obtained the evidence pursuant to the warrant; this opinion was
subsequently withdrawn and superseded by a second panel decision that concluded
ultimately the same.
83
See id. at 1006 (providing a synopsis of the guidelines that the court employs during
the course of its decision).
84
Id. at 998. The court further suggested that if the government cannot be sure whether
data can be erased, concealed, or destroyed without examining every file, then every file
the government comes into contact with will necessarily come into plain view. Id.
Additionally, if the government is the entity that decides how much evidence will be taken
from the site, it creates a powerful incentive for the government to overestimate the
amount of evidence needed or simply lead to a seizure of “more rather than less.” Id. The
court illustrated the possible thought process aptly with the following hypothetical excerpt:
Why stop at the list of all baseball players when you can seize the
entire . . . Directory? Why just that directory and not the entire hard
drive? Why just this computer and not the one in the next room and
the next room after that? Can't find the computer? Seize the Zip disks
under the bed in the room where the computer once might have been.
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protocol that prevents over-seizure of data, such as employing separate
search personnel trained specifically with computers or using specialized
hashing equipment.85 And perhaps most notably, the court further
mandated that when the government obtains search warrants, it should
forswear use of the “plain view” doctrine in electronic evidence cases; if
the government refuses to do so, district courts should require it or deny
the warrant altogether.86
The Ninth Circuit concluded by recognizing that wrongdoers “have
obvious incentives to make data difficult to find” and that the
government has a legitimate need to sift through some information
carefully for disguised pieces of evidence, but that such a pressing need
by law enforcement cannot justify every search warrant for computer
evidence becoming, in effect, a general warrant to search every piece of
information therein.87 The court attempted to create clear rules that
Let’s take everything back to the lab, have a good look around and see
what we might stumble upon.
Id. (citation omitted).
85
Id. at 996. The court suggested that the personnel could either be employed through
the police force or government, or they could be privately contracted. Id. The court also
suggested that in certain cases, the personnel to sort the files should be appointed by the
judicial officer in charge of issuing the warrant. Id. In December 2009, for instance, a
district court within the Ninth Circuit determined that the search protocol provided by the
warrant—including that the government could only remove an electronic device from the
search location if it could not be searched reasonably on-site and that the government had
to complete an off-site search no later than thirty calendar days after the initial execution of
the warrant and had to return the device within thirty calendar days after the search.
United States v. Cerna, No. CR 08-0730, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122847, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
21, 2009). The protocol also required the government to make “all reasonable efforts” to
use methods and procedures that minimized exposure of irrelevant, privileged, or
confidential files. Id. The district court concluded that the protocol “was sufficiently
tailored to meet the criteria established in Comprehensive Drug Testing.” Id.
86
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d. at 998–99. The majority and dissenting
opinions quarreled over the relevance of the “plain view” doctrine in such cases and
whether allowing the doctrine created a free-for-all of “general” searches when computers
are involved. See id. (suggesting that if the government can apply the plain view doctrine
in the context of digital searches and seizures it effectively risks the privacy of the entire
American populace). “To avoid this illogical result,” the majority opinion also suggested
that the government should forswear reliance on “any similar doctrine that would allow it
to retain data to which it has gained access only because it was required to segregate
seizable from non-seizable data.” Id. But see United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W,
2009 WL 4728690, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009) (suggesting that the Ninth Circuit approach is
perhaps misguided because it presumes police misconduct is the rule, rather than the
exception).
87
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1004 The court was clearly taken aback by
the actions of the government and wondered what the bounds might be in the future,
noting that authorization to search some computer files, by virtue of the government’s
reliance on the plain view exception, automatically becomes authorization to search all of
the files “in the same subdirectory, and all files in an enveloping directory, a neighboring
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struck a fair balance between individual and law enforcement interests,
and felt the need “to update Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of
electronic searches.”88
After the court issued its original en banc decision in Comprehensive
Drug Testing, several parties to the litigation, including the Department
of Justice (“DOJ”), requested that the Ninth Circuit rehear the case by a
“Full Court.”89 The Ninth Circuit ultimately denied the requests for
rehearing en banc by the full court90 and instead opted to issue a per
curiam opinion that would revise and supersede the original en banc

hard drive, a nearby computer or nearby storage media.” Id. at 1005. And where
computers happen not to be near one another, but are connected electronically, “the
original search might justify examining files in computers many miles away, on a theory
that incriminating electronic data could have been shuttled and concealed there.” Id.
Concerning the majority even more is perhaps the development of web-based e-mail
accounts, picture sharing sites, slideshows, computer codes, etc., that store messages,
pictures, or other data “along with billions of other messages from and to millions of other
people.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded that under the government’s formulation of
the plain view exception, seizure of Google’s e-mail servers “to look for a few incriminating
messages could jeopardize the privacy of millions.” Id.
88
Id. at 1006. On the other hand, courts adhering to the closed container approach to
computers—or at least those opting to insist on adherence to the common law approach of
reasoned decisionmaking based solely on the facts at hand—have simply applied existing
Fourth Amendment doctrine to the searches of computers. See, e.g., United States v.
Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that a warrant that “permitted the
officers to search for anything—from child pornography to tax returns to private
correspondence,” was “precisely the kind of ‘wide-ranging exploratory search[] that the
Framers intended to prohibit’” (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)));
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[O]fficers [should] specify in a
warrant which type of files are sought.”); United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 584–
85 (D. Vt. 1998) (invalidating a warrant for failure to identify with particularity the
underlying information to be seized); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov.
15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding in the context of a grand jury
subpoena that specificity is required with respect to the categories of information
requested, not merely the storage devices).
89
See Orin Kerr, DOJ Files Brief Supporting Super-En-Banc in CDT, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Nov. 24, 2009, 1:26 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/11/24/doj-files-brief-supporting-superen-banc-in-cdt. The brief filed on behalf of the Justice Department—signed by many of the
highest ranking attorneys in the DOJ—criticized the original en banc panel for having
articulated such “sweeping new rules,” noted that the government had never asked for—
and the Ninth Circuit had never granted—en banc review by the full court, and ultimately
sought rescission of the original opinion or, alternatively, a chance to brief the court on the
repercussions of the new protocol. See id.
90
See Musetta Durkee, Ninth Circuit Relaxes Electronic Search Procedures in United States
v.
Comprehensive
Drug
Testing
Rehearing,
BOLT
(Sept.
28,
2010),
http://btlj.org/2010/09/28/ninth-circuit-relaxes-electronic-search-procedures-in-unitedstates-v-comprehensive-drug-testing-rehearing (“Following . . . requests from Solicitor
General Kagan and others on behalf of the Obama Administration, the Ninth Circuit
conceded to revisit the opinion en banc, but denied the super en banc request.”).
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decision.91 In response to pressures by law enforcement officials—not to
mention the Obama administration and then-Solicitor General Elena
Kagan—the Ninth Circuit’s revised opinion employs much of the same
language as the original en banc decision, but relaxes the mandatory
procedures for issuance of a warrant by omitting the language exacting
Chief Judge
mandatory requirements on government officials.92
Kozinski—the author of the original en banc majority opinion—issued a
concurring opinion joined by four other judges, which recited precisely
the same limitations on government as the original en banc decision, and
continued to urge magistrate judges to require the government to
“forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine.”93 The immediate effect of
91
See Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (per
curiam) (ordering the revision of the original en banc decision and denoting that the new
en banc decision shall “constitute the final action of the court”). Notably, the new decision
by the Ninth Circuit is no longer attributed to Chief Judge Kozinski, who instead filed a
concurring opinion. See id. (revising and superseding the original en banc decision penned
by Chief Judge Kozinski); Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 993 (constituting the
original en banc disposition authored by Chief Judge Kozinski).
92
See Durkee, supra note 90 (“Federal prosecutors and the Obama administration
contested that these procedural requirements were too stringent. . . . [T]hen-Solicitor
General Elena Kagan argued that the Ninth Circuit’s strict guidelines produced a
‘chill[ing]’ effect on the ability of prosecutors to obtain new search warrants for computers
and other electronic data and records.” (second alteration in original)). Compare
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1006 (recounting the protocol government
should follow in seeking warrants), with Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1177
(employing precisely the same language as the original en banc majority opinion by
Kozinski, C.J., but omitting the controversial recitation of limitations on the government in
the “Concluding Thoughts” section of the opinion).
93
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998. Compare id. at 1006 (enunciating five
limitations on government in the context of searches and seizures of electronically stored
information), with Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1179 (Kozinski, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Kleinfeld, Fletcher, Paez, and Smith, JJ.) (enunciating the same five
limitations on government and reiterating that “[i]f the government believes it’s entitled to
retain data as to which no probable cause was shown in the original warrant, it may seek a
new warrant or justify the warrantless seizure by some means other than plain view”).
Chief Judge Kozinski also reaffirmed his belief that
[w]hen the government wishes to obtain a warrant to examine a
computer hard drive or electronic storage medium . . . or when a
search for evidence could result in the seizure of a computer,
magistrate judges should insist that the government forswear reliance
on the plain view doctrine[, and] should also require the government
to forswear reliance on any similar doctrine that would allow retention
of data obtained only because the government was required to
segregate seizable from non-seizable data. This will ensure that future
searches of electronic records do not “make a mockery of Tamura”—
indeed, the Fourth Amendment—by turning all warrants for digital
data into general warrants. If the government doesn’t consent to such
a waiver, the magistrate judge should [require separation] by an
independent third party . . . or deny the warrant altogether.
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the Ninth Circuit’s revision is that the five limitations announced by the
court in the original en banc decision are no longer binding authority,
but now merely provide guidance to magistrates in attempting to
balance the Fourth Amendment’s mandates with law enforcement’s
needs in effective and efficient operation.94 Although the Ninth Circuit
amended its position as to the plain view doctrine’s application to digital
searches and seizures to permit the government more latitude, the
volatile disposition of the case, and the circuit’s inability to issue a
decision with which it was satisfied, serve to highlight the daunting
tasks that face magistrates and appeals courts alike in attempting to
fashion constitutional rules that adequately serve each of the competing
interests.95
3.

The Tenth Circuit’s Indirect “Special Approach”

In United States v. Carey, the Tenth Circuit addressed the similar issue
of whether a police search was constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment and created a “special approach” to digital evidence cases.96
In Carey, a law enforcement official searching a computer pursuant to a
warrant for evidence relating to narcotics came across images of child
pornography.97 He subsequently abandoned the search for the narcotics
evidence named in the warrant and began to look for additional images
of child pornography.98 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the search for
Id. at 1178 (citation omitted).
94
See Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1183 (Callahan, J, concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I initially express my concerns with the proposed guidelines for
searches of electronically stored data that are set forth in the Chief Judge’s concurring
opinion. The concurrence is not joined by a majority of the en banc panel and accordingly
the suggested guidelines are not Ninth Circuit law.”); Durkee, supra note 90 (“In practical
effect, this revised en banc opinion no longer makes Kozinski’s five-part procedural
requirements binding for magistrate courts. Instead, magistrate[s] are required only to use
these five procedural safeguards as ‘a useful tool for the future.’” (quoting Comprehensive
Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1180 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring))).
95
See Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1177 (majority opinion) (“[The reality
that over-seizing is inherent within the digital search context] calls for greater vigilance on
the part of judicial officers in striking the right balance between the government’s interest
in law enforcement and the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures.”). The new decision ultimately recognized that “[e]veryone’s interests are best
served if there are clear rules to follow that strike a fair balance between the legitimate
needs of law enforcement and the right of individuals and enterprises to the privacy that is
at the heart of the Fourth Amendment,” and “updated Tamura to apply to the daunting
realities of electronic searches.” Id.
96
172 F.3d 1268, 1271, 1275 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999).
97
Id. at 1271.
98
Id. The defendant had been under investigation for possible sale and possession of
cocaine, and the police obtained a warrant for his arrest. Id. While at his residence,
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additional images was improper and employed a “special approach” in
an attempt to avoid allowing discovery of evidence outside the scope of
the warrant in computer searches.99
The defendant argued that the search of the computers transformed
the warrant into a “general warrant” and resulted in a general—and
therefore illegal—search of the computers and their files.100 The
government alleged that the plain view doctrine authorized the police
seizure of the files and that the defendant’s written consent allowed their

however, the police noticed in plain view a bong and what appeared to be marijuana;
surprised, the police asked for consent to search the rest of the apartment, and after much
discussion, Carey obliged and signed a formal written consent. Id. With such consent, the
officers returned to the apartment later that night and discovered cocaine, marijuana, and
hallucinogenic mushrooms. Id. The officers also seized two computers that they believed
might evidence drug dealing, which they took back to the police station and obtained a
warrant to search. Id. at 1272. The warrant allowed the police to search for “names,
telephone numbers, ledgers, receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances.” Id. at 1272–73. The police
copied the hard drives and began searching through the files by entering key words into
the computer’s search mechanism to find “text-based” files containing such words; this
search, however, produced no files “related to drugs.” Id. at 1271. The key words were
terms such as “money, accounts, people, so forth.” Id. The officers continued their search
by sifting through the directories until they encountered some files they “[were] not
familiar with,” which were non-text, JPG files. Id. An officer opened the first file and it
contained child pornography. Id. The police copied the rest of the JPG files to disks and
searched through approximately one hundred more in attempting to locate additional
evidence of child pornography. Id. When being questioned by the government, the officer
searching the computer files stated that until he opened each file, he really did not know its
contents. Id. However, he acknowledged that he downloaded and viewed these files
knowing each of them contained pictures. Id. Still, he claimed that “I wasn’t conducting a
search for child pornography, [but] that happened to be what these turned out to be.” Id.
From the tone of the opinion, the court seemed hesitant to believe his testimony. See id.
99
Id. at 1275 n.7, 1277. The court advised: “Where officers come across relevant
documents so intermingled with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted
at the site, the officers may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magistrate of
the conditions and limitations on a further search through the documents.” Id. at 1275.
This special approach has gained much headway in the judiciary, but also has many
skeptics. See RayMing Chang, Why the Plain View Doctrine Should Not Apply to Digital
Evidence, 12 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 31, 49 (2007) (suggesting that much of the
problem with the Tenth Circuit’s approach in Carey was the unwillingness of the court to
directly apply the plain view doctrine to digital evidence); infra Part III.B (discussing the
pros and cons of applying a special approach to the application of the plain view doctrine
to computer-related evidence).
100
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271–72. The defendant in Carey argued that, when examined
against the history and case law of the Fourth Amendment, the search constituted general
rummaging in “flagrant disregard” for the terms of the warrant and in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, and that despite the specificity of the search warrant, files not
pertaining to the sale or distribution of controlled substances were opened and searched,
and such files should have been suppressed. Id. at 1272.
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search.101 The Tenth Circuit found the government’s plain view
argument unavailing because the investigator had to open the files to
view them before he knew whether they contained drug-related
activity.102 The court reasoned that because the warrant permitted only
the search of the computer files for “names, telephone numbers, ledgers,
receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence pertaining to the
sale and distribution of controlled substances,” the scope of the search
was limited to evidence relevant to drug trafficking.103 The court noted
that when the investigator discovered the first pornographic image he
abandoned his search for drugs and began searching for similar
pornographic materials and thus was searching outside the parameters
of the warrant.104 The court resolved the case on other grounds,

101
Id. According to the government’s line of argument, “a computer search such as the
one undertaken in this case is tantamount to looking for documents in a file cabinet,
pursuant to a valid search warrant, and instead finding child pornography.” Id. The
government’s reasoning continued that “[j]ust as if officers ha[d] seized pornographic
photographs from a file cabinet, seizure of the pornographic computer images was
permissible because officers had a valid warrant, the pornographic images were in plain
view, and the incriminating nature was readily apparent.” Id. The warrant, therefore,
“authorized the officer to search any file because ‘any file might well have contained
information relating to drug crimes and the fact that some files might have appeared to
have been graphics files would not necessarily preclude them from containing such
information.’” Id. Finally, the government argued that the defendant’s consent to search
the apartment overrode all of these questions because it extended to the search of every file
on both computers. Id.
102
Id. at 1273. The court aptly stated that “it is the contents of the files and not the files
themselves which were seized,” and noted that the investigator “could not at first
distinguish between the text files and the JPG files upon which he did an unsuccessful
word search. Indeed, he had to open the first JPG file and examine its contents to
determine what the file contained.” Id. Thus, the court analogized the files on the
computer with separate compartments in a coat or suitcase; each must be opened
individually and the contents examined before the police will know what each contains. Id.
at 1277.
103
Id. at 1272–73. The Tenth Circuit ultimately looked to the subjective intent of the
officer conducting the search and seizure. See id. at 1273 (noting that the officer
“abandoned [his original] search” by looking at the subsequent files, and, thus, because the
officer “expected to find child pornography and not material related to drugs,” the court
was unable to say “the contents of each of [the subsequent] files were inadvertently
discovered”). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has explicitly concluded that whether
evidence is discovered inadvertently is completely irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment
analysis in regards to the plain view doctrine—at least insofar as physical evidence is
concerned. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1990) (concluding that the
“inadvertence requirement” of the plain view doctrine should no longer be analyzed as
part of the application of the doctrine).
104
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277 (Baldock, J., concurring). After viewing the contents of the first
file, the investigator, according to his own testimony, stated that he then had “probable
cause” to believe the remaining JPG files contained similar erotic material. Id. at 1276.
Thus, through the investigator’s own admission, it was clear that each time he opened a
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ultimately concluding that all but the first pornographic image were
outside the scope of the warrant, but noted in dicta that the
pornographic images were in closed files and thus not in plain view.105
The court also provided several means by which investigators could
tailor their future conduct to meet the commands of the Fourth
Amendment: they could observe file types and titles listed on the
directory, do a key word search for relevant terms, or read portions of
each file stored in the memory.106
One enduring aspect of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Carey is the
court’s rejection of the government’s proposed “file cabinet” analogy,
and its realization that computers are likely to contain large quantities of
intermingled documents.107 The Tenth Circuit concluded that file cabinet
subsequent JPG file he expected to find child pornography and not material related to
drugs. Id.
105
Id. at 1273 (majority opinion). The court noted that “[a]lthough the question of what
constitutes ‘plain view’ in the context of computer files is intriguing and appears to be an
issue of first impression for this court, and many others, we do not need to reach it here.”
Id. The Tenth Circuit ultimately determined that the fact the files were labeled as “JPG”
and had sexually suggestive titles, the officer knew—especially after opening the first of the
pornographic files—that he was not going to find drug related activity. Id. at 1274.
106
Id. at 1276.
107
Id. at 1275. Academics have likewise supported this notion. See Susan W. Brenner &
Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches and Seizures: Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH.
TELECOMM.
&
TECH.
L.
REV.
39,
60–63,
81–82
(2002),
available
at
http://www.mttlr.org/voleight/Brenner.pdf (suggesting that computers and computer
storage systems differ from paper documents, and therefore require different rules and
approaches). Many courts, however, have also analogized computers to other more
familiar tangible objects such as datebooks, containers, briefcases, and other closed
containers. See, e.g., United States v. Chan, 830 F. Supp. 531, 534 (N.D. Cal. 1993). In Chan,
the court stated that “[t]he expectation of privacy in an electronic repository for personal
data is therefore analogous to that in a personal address book or other repository for such
information.” Id. Courts have also held that “an individual has the same expectation of
privacy in a pager, computer or other electronic data storage and retrieval device as in a
closed container.” Id. at 535 (quoting United States v. Blas, No. 90-CR-162, 1990 WL 265179,
at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 4, 1990)); see also United States v. David, 756 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (D.
Nev. 1991) (holding that a computer’s memory, due to its ability to store and hold large
amounts of information, “is indistinguishable from any other closed container, and is
entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protection” (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 427 (1981))). Although appellate courts have upheld some searches and seizures of
computer memory devices, these courts have all relied on an individual’s lack of standing
to challenge the search and have avoided indications that computer memory enjoys
anything other than a very high level of protection. E.g., United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d
1029, 1031–32 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Meriwether, 917 F.2d 955, 958–59 (6th Cir.
1990). Further, the Department of Justice relies, at least in part, on the closed container
approach to digital searches and seizures. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING
AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS pt. I.B.2 (July 2002), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS36377 (“To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information stored in a computer, it helps to treat the computer like a closed container such

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/7

Hood: No Requirement Left Behind: The Inadvertent Discovery Requirement

2011]

No Requirement Left Behind

1561

and closed-container analogies to computers and computer files are
insufficient because they oversimplify the realities of mass storage
devices.108 The Fourth Amendment should provide protection in an area
that was little contemplated during its proliferation.109
III. ANALYSIS
Courts have certainly struggled in attempting to apply traditional
rules and concepts of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the context of
computer and digital evidence. Part III of this Note discusses the
positive and negative aspects of the various approaches courts have
taken in an attempt to reconcile these novel difficulties with the Fourth
Part III.A specifically
Amendment’s constitutional protections.110
discusses the circumstances under which computer searches become
overly broad and the avenues courts have employed to combat this
phenomenon.111 Part III.B analyzes the “special approaches” that courts
have taken in an attempt to reconcile Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
individual civil liberties, and the government’s interest in the proper
administration of justice, and discusses both the helpful and problematic
facets of the judicial attempts.112 Finally, Part III.C evaluates the ability
of the container analogy to adequately safeguard constitutional rights,
while remaining sympathetic to the efforts of law enforcement.113
Ultimately, Part III concludes that existing approaches fail to properly
as a briefcase or file cabinet,” and that the Constitution generally does not allow for the
government “accessing and viewing information stored in a computer . . . if it would be
prohibited from opening a closed container and examining its contents in the same
situation”).
108
Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275. Computer storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and
variety of information than storage methods from the past and as a result “computers make
tempting targets in searches for incriminating information.” Id. (quoting Winick, supra note
14, at 104). “Relying on [such misplaced analogies] may lead courts to ‘oversimplify a
complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern
computer storage.’” Id. (quoting Winick, supra note 14, at 110).
109
See infra Part III.B–C (discussing the positive and negative aspects of the different
approaches courts have taken to attempt to abide by this concept).
110
See infra Part III (analyzing the approaches courts have taken when applying the plain
view doctrine in the context of digital evidence cases).
111
See infra Part III.A (discussing the circumstances under which warrants may become
general and the attempts by courts to reconcile what they discern to be a novel dilemma
within Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
112
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the “special approaches” that courts have taken to
attempt to solve this problem, and the positive and negative aspects of this line of
reasoning).
113
See infra Part III.C (evaluating the feasibility of the closed-container analogies between
computers and containers in the ambit of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and more
specifically, in regard to the plain view doctrine).
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balance the competing interests involved in computer evidence cases and
discusses the shortcomings of the various approaches to the problem
while leaving open possible solutions and avenues for remedy.114
A. When Computer Searches Become General
Why should it matter that the government is able to sift through all
of the files on a given computer? And should information stored on a
computer system or general server be afforded more or less
constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment? It is generally
accepted that if, in the context of digital evidence, police are otherwise in
a valid position to view the computer screen, the images on the screen
will be deemed in “plain view.”115 However, courts and scholars dealing
with the more complicated issue of data stored within a computer—or
even data on an entire computer system—have created two independent
lines of reasoning, each with its own advantages and disadvantages.116

See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to the problem of applying the plain view
doctrine in the context of computer evidence cases).
115
Compare People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding that police
who observed “bookmarks with references to teenagers and so forth,” did not have
probable cause to believe that computer contained child pornography), State v. Mays, 829
N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that observations of a computer screen
during the search of a home qualified as in plain view), and State v. One Pioneer CD-ROM
Changer, 891 P.2d 600, 604–05 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (during execution of search warrant
based on allegations that suspect was distributing pornographic material, police
observations of computer established that the equipment and its possible criminal use were
in plain view), with United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that the
observation of nude women on computer screen by officer during search of apartment did
not justify search of computer for other incriminating data), and State v. Brown, 813 N.E.2d
956, 960–62 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the incriminating nature of computers and
their contents is not immediately apparent based on mere observation of two computers in
defendant’s house, where there was no pornography displayed on screen, and where
police merely knew that pornographic material had been printed from a computer).
116
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 997–98, 999, 1000–01, 1003–04, 1006
(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (creating a special approach and establishing guidelines that should be “vigilant[ly]”
adhered to by lower courts). These guidelines are as follows:
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance
upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.
2. Segregation and redaction [of computer data] must be either
done by specialized personnel or an independent third party. . . .
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of
destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that
information in other judicial fora.
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to
uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only
that information may be examined by the case agents.
114
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The first view suggests that digital evidence searches require a
special approach—even going as far as to forswear use of the plain view
doctrine entirely and provide judicially imposed guidelines for executing
This approach is impractical as applied, stifles the
a search.117
administration of justice, and finds little if any foundation in

5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully
possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate
informed about when it has done so and what it has kept.
Id. at 1006. Compare id. (urging magistrates to require the government to forswear reliance
on either the plain view doctrine or any other similar doctrine), with United States v.
Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the government’s discovery of
child pornography was inadvertent during a search for fake ID’s and therefore valid
pursuant to the plain view exception), and United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th
Cir. 1999) (suggesting that the correct inquiry asks whether the official “abandoned” his
original search and therefore unconstitutionally expanded the scope of the warrant—
turning the initially limited and constitutional search into a general, exploratory, and
unconstitutional search).
117
See, e.g., Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272–75 (holding that continuing to open files in a search
for child pornography after the first file had already been opened and observed, during the
execution of a search warrant for documentary evidence relating to drugs, could not be
justified by the plain view doctrine because the files were “closed” and unambiguously
labeled). The Tenth Circuit in Carey further suggested that the search of the computer was
limited by judicial discretion including, for example, searches by file name or file type. Id.
at 1273. Interestingly, however, both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits—as well as a number of
other courts—have explicitly found that search protocols are not necessary because the
object of the search serves to narrow the search itself. United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966
(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2005). That is to say, if
agents are issued a warrant to search for files related to child pornography, the fact they are
authorized to look only for child pornography is enough to keep the search within the
scope of the warrant. See Hill, 459 F.3d at 970–71 (suggesting that the object of the search
can serve to narrow the scope of the search); Brooks, 427 F.3d at 1253–55 (suggesting the
same). Suppose, however, that the government has probable cause to believe an individual
is going to launch a terrorist attack on a given landmark or well-known area. Under a
special approach, the government might be prohibited from immediately reviewing the
entire contents of a computer to ascertain whether other terrorist schemes were being
plotted against other areas in the United States. See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d
at 998 (imposing strict judicial guidelines that forswear the plain-view doctrine or any
similar doctrine in computer evidence cases); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268 (imposing a special
approach that inquires as to the subjective intent of the officer to be used in computer
evidence cases). But see Giberson, 527 F.3d at 887–88 (declining to impose heightened
Fourth Amendment protections in computer search cases unless they are “based on a
principle that is not technology-specific”). To see how this Note’s proposed solution would
handle such a dilemma, see infra Part IV.B.1 (suggesting that if the government knew of the
additional threats prior to executing the warrant and failed to particularize them therein—
either negligently or because it was unsure as to whether probable cause existed—the
seizure would be unconstitutional; otherwise, the government would be allowed to
conduct their search within the scope of the warrant and seize any information regarding
the additional plots).
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precedent.118 This view not only generates substantial costs to society
and underestimates the guile of modern criminals in their ability to
conceal digital information with rapidly increasing ease, but disregards
the Supreme Court’s holding in Horton v. California, which completely
dispelled the inadvertence requirement to plain view seizures.119
The second view equates computers with closed containers, such as
lockers, briefcases, and luggage, and the data stored therein as contents
of the container.120 This view, to some extent, underestimates the
differences between digital evidence and physical evidence and grants
great latitude to the government in executing search warrants.121
Nonetheless, it finds foundation in Fourth Amendment precedent and
provides for adequate enforcement of the law.122 Ultimately, these two
views conflict as to the importance of the expectations of privacy in
computer data, the feasibility of employing judicially crafted mandates
for executions of search warrants, and the application of the Fourth

118
See Chang, supra note 99, at 49 (finding that the Tenth Circuit’s special approach
“overlooked” clear instruction from the Supreme Court); Ziff, supra note 60, at 853
(suggesting that the Tenth Circuit’s special approach “incorrectly relies on the subjective
intent of the searching officer to determine the constitutional limits on the scope of a
computer search”); see also infra Part III.B (discussing the positive and negative aspects of
the “special approaches” to computer evidence).
119
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138–40 (1990) (rejecting inadvertent discovery
as necessary for the plain view exception but recognizing that the possibility of officers
using plain view to execute pretextual searches is a legitimate Fourth Amendment
concern); see also United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004)
(rejecting defendant’s argument that the search warrant was overbroad for failing to
articulate a strategy for searching his computer and articulating that such a strategy was
impracticable because defendant could have easily hidden the contraband under
misleading file names).
120
See, e.g., supra note 88 (providing examples of courts that have required the
government to identify the specific data on a computer that is sought under the warrant).
121
See Comprehensive Drug Testing I, 473 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that analogies
between closed containers and computers are tenuous and allows excessive government
latitude in conducting searches and seizures), vacated as moot, 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008),
vacated and granted rehearing en banc, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Carey, 172 F.3d at
1273–74 (confronting a search through defendant’s computer for drug-related evidence that
ultimately yielded child pornography); United States v. Turner, 169 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir.
1999) (confronting a search through a computer for assault-based evidence that ultimately
yielded child pornography); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526–27 (E.D. Va.
1999) (confronting a search through a computer for hacking-related evidence that
ultimately yielded child pornography).
122
As one court has noted, the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment
“serves three related purposes: preventing general searches, preventing the seizure of
objects upon the mistaken assumption that they fall within the magistrate’s authorization,
and preventing the issuance of warrants without a substantial factual basis.” United States
v. Vilar, No. S308CR621KMK, 2007 WL 1075041, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 758–59 (2d Cir. 1984)).
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Amendment’s particularity requirement.123
The proper approach
balances the government’s interest in the administration of justice and
the individual’s interest in remaining free from unreasonable searches
and seizures while adhering to the Supreme Court’s precedential values
in the realm of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.124
B. The Especially Impractical “Special Approach”
As evidenced, there is relatively little case law regarding precisely
how the plain view exception to the warrant requirement should apply
in computer evidence cases; some scholars suggest that courts should
apply the Fourth Amendment’s protections zealously and absolutely.125
Computers, as storehouses of personal information, should enjoy a
strong amount of protection under the Fourth Amendment; thus, the
plethora of information and ever-increasing storage capacities of home
computers justifies the highest expectation of privacy.126 Recently, a
federal district court in New York explicitly embraced the file cabinet
analogy as opposed to the closed-container analogy.127 The court in In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum quashed a grand jury subpoena for a
123
Compare Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1012 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(Callahan and Ikuta, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (expressing “several
concerns regarding the breadth of the majority’s new guidelines that purport to govern
future digital evidence cases”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc), United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
government search was valid because it did not proceed with its search until after an
additional warrant had been obtained), and Comprehensive Drug Testing I, 473 F.3d at 935
(“We reject the dissent’s view that government officials should limit their computer
searches to key words suggested by a searched party.”), with Comprehensive Drug Testing I,
473 F.3d at 964–65 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (noting that “[t]he
more sensible theory with respect to electronic data is to . . . require that a neutral
magistrate examine the co-mingled data . . . to make sure that private information that the
government is not authorized to see remains private. Agents who expect to encounter
intermingled data or who unexpectedly encounter it may not review the data unabated,
but must seek a magistrate’s guidance on how to proceed”), and United States v. Hill, 459
F.3d 966, 975 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that not allowing the police to seize the intermingled
data for further processing would “not only impose a significant and unjustified burden on
police resources, it would also make the search more intrusive”).
124
See infra Part IV (proposing a solution to the problem of applying the plain view
doctrine in the context of digital and computer evidence cases).
125
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 65, at 280 (arguing that new dynamics of computer crime
should result in the creation of new doctrines that “impose some new restrictions on police
conduct”).
126
See Winick, supra note 14 (suggesting that because computers store such a massive
amount of information of various forms they are inherently entitled to heightened
protection under the Fourth Amendment).
127
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 15, 1993, 846 F. Supp. 11, 12–13
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (applying Second Circuit case law regarding files and filing cabinets to
computers and electronic documents).
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company’s hard disk drive because of the innate risk of exposing highly
personal information.128 Thus, it comes as no surprise that seizures of
computers and digital data have inherently high potential for
overreaching and intrusion.129
Accordingly, proponents of the special approach suggest that
analogizing computers to closed containers—thus allowing extremely
broad searches—relies on a “simplistic and inappropriate”
characterization of computers.130 This view suggests the fundamental
differences between digitally stored data and physical data require a
different analysis under the Fourth Amendment, and suggest that
applying the plain view doctrine goes too far.131 For instance, computer
searches are different from physical document searches because
computer forensics tools allow for more narrowly tailored searches than
are possible with paper documentation.132 However, in a reality that
128
Id. at 13. The court further noted that although the disks might contain incriminating
information, they also contained highly personal files, such as a draft of a will and personal
financial information. Id.
129
See supra note 87 (explaining that a search of digital data raises an inherent danger that
the search may involve third-party data as well).
130
See Winick, supra note 14, at 110 (“An analogy between a computer and a container
oversimplifies a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrine and ignores the realities of
massive modern computer storage.”); see also Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 107, at 81–
82 (setting forth some of the differences between searches of “paper documents and
computer-generated evidence” and maintaining that courts should impose restrictions on
computer searches such as limiting the search by file types by requiring a second warrant
for intermingled files and imposing time frames for conducting the search). However, the
Supreme Court has heard this argument and considered it unpersuasive in the past. See
generally Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 139–40 (1990) (arguing that the interest in
“prevent[ing] the police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific
warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is already served by
the requirements that no warrant issue unless it ‘particularly describ[es] the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized,’” and “[s]crupulous adherence to these
requirements serves the interests in limiting the area and duration of the search” (quoting
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987))).
131
See United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 n.7 (10th Cir. 1999) (“We have stated
our belief that the storage capacity of computers requires a special approach, and we do
not intend to comment on the particularity requirement as it applies to all contemporary
media.”); see also People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 160 (Colo. 2001) (Martinez, J., dissenting)
(“Because computers process personal information and effects, they require heightened
protection under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches or seizures.”
(citing Winick, supra note 14, at 80–83)).
132
See In re Search of 3817 W. West End, Chicago, Illinois 60621, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 959
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (recognizing that “while computers present the possibility of confronting far
greater volumes of documents than are typically presented in a paper document search,
computers also present the tools to refine searches in ways that cannot be done with hard
copy files”). However, this line of reasoning fails to account for the ingenuity of the
modern criminal, and the ease with which inculpating information may be hidden, altered,
or destroyed. See United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 582 (D. Vt. 1998) (noting that
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recognizes the rapidly evolving criminal mind, many of these search
processes provide a grossly inadequate means for searching for altered
or encrypted file names or extensions.133 Because there is often no way
to know what is in a file without examining its contents, attempting to
provide judicial direction to searches and seizures of computer data,
especially prior to the search or seizure, subjects magistrates to the
impracticable task of outlining methods or means by which law
enforcement officials may conduct a search.134
This special approach further calls for a significantly circumscribed
ability for law enforcement officials to search throughout an entire
computer and disguises this exacting cost on the administration of justice
as necessary to ensure citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights.135 Thus,
when an officer comes across evidence of a crime unrelated to the given
warrant, this view requires officers to completely halt the search and
petition a neutral magistrate for a second warrant.136 Although images
it may be difficult for government to determine what to seize without doing some level of
review of everything in the cabinet, as “few people keep documents of their criminal
transactions in a folder marked ‘[crime] records’” (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir.1990))).
133
Clancy, supra note 66, at 208–09 (commenting that a court suggesting the government
may not seize or look through a file based on its label is analogous to saying the
government may not seize a plastic bag containing a white powder because it is labeled
“flour” or “talcum powder” (quoting United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 108, 1090–91
(C.D. Cal. 2004))); see United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining
that “in the age of modern technology and commercial availability of various forms of
items, [a] warrant [cannot] be expected to describe with exactitude the precise form the
records [might] take” because records of criminal activity—in this case, drugs—might well
be found in cassettes, leases, and accounts cards, or in cancelled checks); see also Carey, 172
F.3d at 1275 (stating that in cases involving images stored in a computer, the file cabinet
analogy may be inadequate because digital and electronic storage is likely to contain a
greater variety of information than any previous storage methods).
134
See United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Especially when
the user wants to conceal criminal evidence, he often stores it in random order with
deceptive file names. This requires searching authorities to examine all the stored data to
determine whether it is included in the warrant.”); see also Erickson v. Comm’r, 937 F.2d
1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that drug trafficking activity is often concealed or
masked by deceptive records or files); United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91
(C.D. Cal. 2004) (“There is no way to know what is in a [computer] file without examining
its contents, just as there is no sure way of separating talcum from cocaine except by testing
it.”); United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[H]ackers often
intentionally mislabel files, or attempt to bury incriminating files within innocuously
named directories.”); Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 583 (“Computer records are extremely
susceptible to tampering, hiding, or destruction, whether deliberate or inadvertent.”).
135
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the proper balance between the interests of the
government and the individual’s Fourth Amendment protections).
136
United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 987 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that by immediately
going to a magistrate to obtain a second warrant after discovering the initial image of child
pornography, the officer ensured that his search was “reasonable and within the
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that are displayed on a computer screen are clearly recognized as within
plain view, this approach would not extend the plain view doctrine to
closed computer files on a hard drive that are subsequently opened.137
Nor would this view allow for the seizure of information stored on a
network or general server because it would require specified search
procedures for sifting through the massive amounts of information, even
though the procedures may well fall short in allowing for the discovery
of all evidence pertaining to the warrant.138 This view implicitly suggests
that law enforcement officials routinely operate in bad faith and
presumes that proactive stipulations are necessary to curb overly zealous
Ultimately, the special approach is
law enforcement officials.139
problematic because it severely curtails the ability of officers to conduct
general warrants but allows for officers to obtain a second warrant to
search the rest of the computer’s files regardless.140
parameters of the [original] search warrant”). This reasoning, however, runs counter to
explicitly articulated Supreme Court principles. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327
(1987) (noting “the desirability of sparing police, whose viewing of the object in the course
of a lawful search is as legitimate as it would have been in a public place, the inconvenience
and the risk—to themselves or to preservation of the evidence—of going to obtain a
warrant” when evidence is discovered in plain view). The mere technicality of forcing
police to obtain a second warrant does little, if anything, to protect the Fourth Amendment
privacy rights of individuals, and creates an undue and unnecessary burden on the part of
law enforcement officials. See id. at 328.
137
See Walser, 275 F.3d at 987 (noting that the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights
were not violated because the police obtained a second warrant before continuing the
search for child pornography files); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275 (employing a subjective intentbased “special approach” that ultimately asks whether the officer searching the computer
expected to find the incriminating digital evidence).
138
See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (noting that investigators cannot rely on file suffixes to
limit searches for computer files because they do not know if the computer’s owner
attempted to hide his files by changing the file suffixes—which is both easy and common).
139
See United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 3,
2009) (“The CDT protocols impose extraordinary precautions against police misconduct for
all applications for a warrant to search a computer, assuming misconduct will be the rule,
not the exception.”); see also United States v. Kim, 677 F. Supp. 2d 930, 950 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
23, 2009) (finding that “the Government’s attempts to claim that they discovered the files
while looking for evidence of Computer Intrusion is a clear attempt to justify the
government’s warrantless search for evidence of child pornography and to manipulate the
Court into authorizing their defiance of the Magistrate’s order”).
140
See Walser, 275 F.3d at 987 (holding that because the officer obtained the second
warrant to search for files relating to child pornography, he ensured that the “search was
reasonable and within the parameters of the [original] search warrant”); Carey, 172 F.3d at
1276 (holding that officers should obtain a second warrant in order to continue searching
the computer for files relating to child pornography). It further contradicts Supreme Court
precedent by restricting the ability of law enforcement to adequately conduct their duties.
See Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257 (1979) (“[I]t is generally left to the discretion of
the executing officers to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance
of a search authorized by warrant.”).
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While implicitly adhering to this special approach, the Ninth Circuit
in Comprehensive Drug Testing took the judicially unprecedented step of
suggesting that the government “forswear reliance” on the plain view
doctrine or any similar doctrine that would allow the government to retain
data it obtained only because it was unable to properly segregate the
The court reasoned that because the
intermingled evidence.141
government will ultimately determine the extent of the seizure, which is
itself a potentially inaccurate assessment, it will create a powerful
incentive to “seize more rather than less.”142 The court further imposed
requirements that in future computer evidence cases the government
must fairly disclose the actual risk of concealment or destruction of
evidence as opposed to merely the theoretical risk.143 Additionally, in
what will likely extract significant administrative costs, the court
mandated that only specialized computer personnel should sort and
separate the seizable and nonseizable data, as denoted in the search
warrant.144
Demonstrably, courts taking a special approach to the searches and
seizures of computer evidence and digital information are unlikely to
uphold more general searches of computers or find that the computer’s

141
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 998, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (suggesting
that in the context of computer evidence cases, “the government should, in future warrant
applications, forswear reliance on the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine”), revised
and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). But see Farlow, 2009 WL
4728690, at 6 (finding that to require the Government to forswear reliance on the plain view
doctrine is “an extreme remedy better reserved for the unusual, not common case,” and
that such a directive “placed in a different context, is equivalent to demanding that a DEA
investigative team engaged in the search of a residence for drugs promise to ignore
screams from a closet or a victim tied to a chair”).
142
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998.
143
Id. This requirement imposed by the Ninth Circuit is perhaps more properly seen as
its attempt to foreclose what it inferred was bad faith on behalf of the government. See id.
However, in the very same paragraph, the majority opinion recognizes that this bad faith
will be adequately dealt with when determining whether to exclude the evidence vis-à-vis a
motion to dismiss. See id. at 999 (“A lack of candor in this or any other aspect of the
warrant application shall bear heavily against the government in the calculus of any
subsequent motion to return or suppress the seized data.”).
144
Compare id. 1000–01, 1006 (finding that “[s]egregation and redaction must be either
done by specialized personnel or an independent third party”), with id. at 1013 (Callahan &
Ikuta, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the majority opinion
“offers no support for its protocol requiring the segregation of computer data by
specialized personnel or an independent third party,” and that “this new ex ante
restriction . . . raises practical, cost-related concerns”). Of significant importance to the
concurring judges was the majority’s “newly minted search protocol[]” that mandates
warrants make clear that “only persons not involved in the investigation may examine and
segregate the data.” Id. at 1011 n.6.
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files are subject to the plain view doctrine.145 Attempting to guard
against overbroad warrants that jeopardize the Fourth Amendment
rights of innocent Americans as well as criminals, this special approach
suggests that applying the plain view doctrine to computer searches
gives the government “free rein” to rummage through computers.146
Proponents further suggest that applying this specialized, more
circumscribed approach is easily reconciled with the Supreme Court’s
precedent in Hicks; however, this fails to recognize that unlike the
physical property confronted in Hicks, digital property and computer
evidence create novel opportunities for criminals to disguise or conceal
evidence of incriminating character.147 Ultimately, it appears as though
the special approach to computer searches is taking the forefront in the
minds of scholars and is beginning to see increased popularity in the
judiciary as well.148
See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273 (finding that because the officers expected to find the
subsequent images of child pornography—and therefore did not “inadvertently discover[]”
the images—the images could not rightly be considered within plain view). In Carey, the
defendant argued that the officer’s “search of the computers transformed the warrant into a
‘general warrant’ and resulted in a general and illegal search of the computers and their
files.” Id. at 1271–72; see also United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 422 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(finding that where a colonel used a personal computer to transport child pornography, the
plain view doctrine did not apply to the search of computer files because the warrant did
not authorize the search of those files and view was obtained as a result of improper
governmental opening, not as a result of seeing what was legitimately in plain view).
146
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998 (“If the government can’t be sure
whether data may be concealed, compressed, erased or booby-trapped without carefully
examining the contents of every file—and we have no cavil with this general proposition—
then everything the government chooses to seize will, under this theory, automatically
come into plain view.”); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271–72 (finding that if the government were
allowed to use the plain view doctrine it could transform all searches of computers into
“general warrant[s]”).
147
See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1984) (holding that an officer who moved stereo
equipment to see the serial numbers underneath, and who, after subsequently phoning the
numbers into headquarters and determining the equipment was stolen, seized the
evidence, did not validly do so pursuant to the plain view doctrine). This, however, does
not illustrate that the Supreme Court is against invoking the plain view doctrine or even
that they are for a more circumscribed reading of it; rather, it merely illustrates that
evidence seized pursuant to plain view must be immediately apparent, and that any search
beyond what is immediately apparent renders the determination of the criminality of the
evidence not immediate. See id. at 324–25.
148
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1006 (adopting a special approach to the
plain view exception in computer evidence cases, attempting to “update” existing Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to accord computer technology, and ultimately banning
government use of the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine in the context of computer
evidence cases); Carey, 172 F.3d at 1268 (explicitly adopting a special approach to computer
evidence cases that relies heavily on the subjective intent or mindset of the investigating
officials); Winick, supra note 14, at 81 (discussing his version of the “special approach” to
computer evidence cases).
145
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C. The Attenuated Closed-Container Analogy
“Container” is a well-defined and highly evolved term within Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.149 Many courts compare digitally stored
data as a form of document and therefore authorize the search of
computer files even if the warrant only specifies that writings or records
may be searched.150 This line of reasoning is sympathetic to the varying
needs of law enforcement officials and suggests the government need
not know the exact “form that records may take.”151 Critics regard this
view as overly simplistic because it asserts that there is no distinction
between electronic records and physical records.152 However, this view
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent in Andresen v. Maryland
that “some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in
order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers
authorized to be seized.”153 Therefore, under the theory that data is a
form of document and the computer is a container holding the

See generally CLANCY, supra note 23, at 40–42 (providing a background as to how
containers are treated under the Fourth Amendment); TASLITZ, supra note 21, at pt. 1
(providing the same).
150
See also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574, 581 (D. Vt. 1998) (holding that
warrant authorizing search for “records” permitted search of “computers, disks, and
similar property”); Frasier v. State, 794 N.E.2d 449, 454, 460 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that warrant which authorized search of notes and records of marijuana sales also
permitted the police to examine computer files).
151
United States v. Gawryisak, 972 F. Supp. 853, 861 (D.N.J. 1997), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1281 (3d
Cir. 1999).
152
United States v. Lievertz, 247 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063 (S.D. Ind. 2002). The court in
Lievertz suggested that there is “no principled distinction between those records kept
electronically and those in paper form.” Id. However, some courts have suggested that
this view is sensitive to individuals because there is “no justification for favoring those who
are capable of storing their records on computer over those who keep hard copies of their
records.” Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 584.
153
427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976); see Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 582, 584 (recognizing the
reality that few people store their incriminating records in clearly labeled boxes or
containers); see also United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that few
people label their belongings that are incriminating with obvious labels); United States v.
Gray 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528 (E.D. Va. 1999) (suggesting few people label their
incriminating evidence in obvious ways). The Supreme Court in Andresen observed the
following:
We recognize that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person’s papers that are
not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for physical
objects whose relevance is more easily ascertainable. In searches for
papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined,
at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact,
among those papers authorized to be seized.
Andresen, 427 U.S. at 482 n.11.
149
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document, traditional rules of document searches should apply and
govern conduct.154
Courts—and to a lesser extent scholars—adhering to the container
approach to computer evidence have reasoned that there is no need to
impute novel approaches into the law each time a novel difficulty
arises.155 Instead, courts have looked to whether the warrant was
sufficiently particular to describe the “place[s] to be searched” or the
“persons or things to be seized.”156 These courts give deference to the
154
See, e.g., United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (explicitly
comparing a computer to a closed container and suggesting the application of the law is
analogous). In Barth, the defendant took his computer to a repair shop and pornographic
images of children were subsequently discovered; the computer was searched by police
without a warrant. Id. at 930. The court found that the defendant did not lose a reasonable
expectation to privacy by delivering the hard drive to a computer technician for repairs, so
that a warrantless police search of the hard drive violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
More important, however, is the court’s reasoning. The court noted that although the
protection afforded to a person’s computer files and hard drive was not well-defined, it
concluded that the Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer files and hard drives
was similar to the protection afforded a person’s closed containers and closed personal
effects. Id. at 932. According to the court, outside of automobile searches, a warrant was
usually required to search the contents of a closed container because the owner’s
expectation of privacy related to the contents of that container rather than to the container
itself. Id. By placing data in files in a storage device such as his hard drive, the court
reasoned, the defendant manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
those files. Id. Further holding that the defendant did not lose his reasonable expectation
of privacy in his closed, individual files when he gave the hard drive to the technician, the
court stressed that the defendant gave the hard drive to the technician for the limited
purpose of repairing a problem unrelated to specific files and also expected that he would
have the unit back the following morning to continue his business. Id.
155
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1013 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(Callahan and Ikuta, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Rather than adopting
[a special] efficient but overbroad approach, the prudent course would be to allow the
contours of the plain view doctrine to develop incrementally through the normal course of
fact-based case adjudication.”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.
2010) (en banc).
156
See U.S. CONST. Amend. IV; supra Parts II.A.1, II.A.2 (discussing how courts have used
the warrant requirement and the particularity requirement, respectively, to attempt to
reconcile novel difficulties that computers create within the context of the Fourth
Amendment). The nature of the crime, for example, might require a broad police search.
See, e.g., Andresen, 427 U.S. at 480–81 n.10 (“Like a jigsaw puzzle, the whole ‘picture’ of
petitioner’s false-pretense scheme . . . could be shown only by placing in the proper place
the many pieces of evidence that, taken singly, would show comparatively little.”); United
States v. Regan, 706 F. Supp. 1102, 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“The degree to which a warrant
must state its terms with particularity varies inversely with the complexity of the criminal
activity investigated.”). The type of evidence sought is also relevant; in particular, courts
have recognized that documentary evidence may be difficult to describe ex ante with the
same particularity as a murder weapon or stolen property. See, e.g., United States v. Riley,
906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (“It is true that a warrant authorizing seizure of records of
criminal activity permits officers to examine many papers in a suspect’s possession to
determine if they are within the described category. But allowing some latitude in this
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judge who issued the warrant when assessing the sufficiency of the
allegations or the description of the items sought.157 Thus, by allowing
the issuing magistrate the ability to set the parameters of the search
based on personalized knowledge of the specific facts at hand, courts are
able to adequately safeguard Fourth Amendment interests by ensuring
warrants are sufficiently particular and supported by probable cause.158
Much of the disagreement so readily apparent among the courts and
academics stems from a conflict over the importance of requiring law
enforcement officials to preemptively secure a warrant.159 Importing
regard simply recognizes the reality that few people keep documents of their criminal
transactions in a folder marked ‘drug records.’”); United States v. Zanche, 541 F. Supp. 207,
210 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Unlike other forms of property, business records are often incapable
of being itemized one by one, particularly when their existence, but not their precise names
or quantity, is all that is known.”).
157
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1012–13 (Callahan, J. and Ikuta, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that the majority opinions sweeping
guidelines and broad prescriptions “go significantly beyond what is necessary,” and that
“its protocols are dicta and might be best viewed as a ‘best practices’ manual”).
158
See supra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing how courts have used the warrant and the
particularity requirements to attempt to reconcile novel difficulties that computers create
within the context of the Fourth Amendment).
159
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971) (“Much the most important
part of the conflict that has been so notable in this Court’s attempts over a hundred years to
develop a coherent body of Fourth Amendment law has been caused by disagreement over
the importance of requiring law enforcement officers to secure warrants.”). Compare
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1000 (holding that in order to guard against
future constitutional violations, the issuing judicial officer should insert a preemptive
search protocol), United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 890−91 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that where the police did not continue a search until after obtaining an additional search
warrant, no constitutional violation occurred), and In re Search of 3817 W. West End, 321 F.
Supp. 2d 953, 959−61 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (holding that a magistrate can condition the search of
computers on the government developing a search protocol before the actual search begins
in order to prevent a general rummaging of the hard drive and files), with United States v.
Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 n.3 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009) (“Even the
most computer literate of judges would struggle to know what protocol is appropriate in
any individual case, and the notion that a busy trial judge is going to be able to invent one
out of whole cloth or to understand whether the proposed protocol meets ill-defined
technical search standards seems unrealistic.”), United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK,
2007 WL 1075041, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007) (holding that while a warrant must state
with sufficient particularity what is to be seized from a computer, “the warrant need not
specify how the computers will be searched”), and United States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d
1226, 1246 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (upholding the validity of a search despite the lack of a search
protocol in the warrant under the assumption that “[w]hile it may be preferable and
advisable to set forth a computer search strategy in a warrant affidavit, failure to do so
does not render computer search provisions [unconstitutional]”). See generally United
States v. Cioffi, 668 F. Supp. 2d 385, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the warrant
requirement was meant to act as a “bulwark against the ‘general warrant’” that the early
colonists so despised); Vilar, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99409, at *1 (noting that the warrant
requirement is the preeminent concern of the Fourth Amendment).
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new theories and doctrines as well as imposing stilted judicial guidelines
that serve as a beacon for future law enforcement does little to clarify the
law surrounding Fourth Amendment searches and seizures involving
computer or digital evidence.160
Accepting this view, however, does not mean that the wholesale
searches of data on computers or computer systems are permitted.161
Courts instead look to traditional means of limiting the scope of
document searches such as the nature of the criminal activity alleged or
the nature of the objects sought in the search warrant.162 Furthermore,
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1013 (Callahan and Ikuta, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (“A measured approach based on the facts of a particular
case is especially warranted in the case of computer-related technology, which is constantly
and quickly evolving. Accordingly, I cannot join in the majority’s approach regarding
application of the plain view doctrine to digital evidence cases.”); see also id. at 1015, 1017
(Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing with “the majority’s analysis of
the issues presented in this case, as applied to this case only” and adding that “[s]uch a rule
departs from existing Supreme Court precedent regarding the ‘plain view’
exception . . . and [does] so without a single citation to the Supreme Court’s extensive
precedent on the subject” (emphasis added)).
161
See People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001) (holding that police “may search the
location authorized by the warrant, including any containers at that location that are
reasonably likely to contain items described in the warrant”, that “[t]his container rationale
is equally applicable to nontraditional, technological ‘containers’ that are reasonably likely
to hold information in less tangible forms,” and that courts cannot expect search warrants
“to anticipate every form an item or repository of information may take, and therefore
courts have affirmed the seizure of things that are similar to, or the ‘functional equivalent’
of, items enumerated in a warrant, as well as containers in which they are reasonably likely
to be found”). This is not to say, however, that courts adopting this view underestimate
the differences in physical and digital evidence and documents; rather, they merely give
significantly less weight to these differences or view them as immaterial to the analysis. See
id. (applying the container theory despite recognizing a heightened degree of intermingling
of relevant and irrelevant evidence); see also United States v. Hunter, 13 F. Supp. 2d 574,
581, 583−84 (D. Vt. 1998) (addressing the concerns of the intermingling of relevant and
irrelevant information).
162
See, e.g., Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d 1085, 1111–12 (9th Cir. 2008)
(disagreeing with the dissent that the government should be forced to rely on the target of
the search to point out the relevant files and copy only specific folders), vacated, 545 F.3d
1106 (9th Cir. 2008), decision reached on appeal, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009). The first panel
decision of Comprehensive Drug Testing aptly recognized the following:
“The government should not be required to trust the suspect’s selflabeling when executing a warrant.” Agents had no duty to rely on
CDT personnel to point out the files seizable under the warrant. Like
most searched parties, CDT had an incentive to avoid giving over
documents of which the government might be unaware and to read
the search warrant as narrowly as possible.
Moreover, the
government had no reason to confine its search to “key words” such
as the names of the baseball players. “Computer files are easy to
disguise or rename, and were we to limit the warrant to such a
specific search protocol, much evidence could escape discovery
160
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because this view permits the law enforcement need to adapt with the
various circumstances, it allows for a more proper administration of
justice.163
Finally, advocates of the container analogy—or perhaps more
generally those opposing the special approach and opting for a more
traditional case-by-case analysis—argue that the establishment of
guidelines stands directly against the common law method of reasoned
decisionmaking.164 In a time when computer technology is evolving at a
tremendous pace, creating concrete guidelines that firmly establish
bright lines is arguably unseemly.165 By evaluating each case on its own
merits and attempting to resolve no more than is necessary, courts can
employ the traditional common law method, which “recognizes the
limitations of human ingenuity and wisdom.”166 The common law
simply because of [the defendants’] labeling of the files.” Such a
limited search could easily have overlooked documents crucial to the
investigation, such as the specimens at Quest, which were identified
only by number.
Id. (citations omitted).
163
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1018 (Bea, J., concurring and dissenting)
(noting that “the establishment of guidelines . . . goes against the grain of the common law
method of reasoned decisionmaking, by which rules evolve from cases over time,” and that
“[b]y focusing on the ‘plain view’ exception as applied to [the case at bar] . . . we would be
employing the traditional common law method of deciding novel questions of law,” and
that this method “recognizes the limitations of human ingenuity and wisdom, by limiting
[judicial] decisions as precisely as possible to the case at hand”). Circuit Judge Bea aptly
recognizes in his dissent that “[t]he common law method permits us to evaluate different
cases over time to discern the most sensible rule given the technologies that develop.” Id.
164
Id. To some extent, the Tenth Circuit—itself explicitly adopting a special approach to
computer evidence—has chosen to adhere to the common law method of reasoned
decisionmaking based narrowly on the facts at hand, such as noting that
[t]he essential inquiry when faced with challenges under the
Fourth Amendment is whether the search or seizure was reasonable—
reasonableness is analyzed in light of what was reasonable at the time
of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption. It is axiomatic that the Fourth
Amendment was adopted as a direct response to the evils of the
general warrants in England and the writs of assistance in the
Colonies.
O’Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465, 1472 (10th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
165
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1018 (noting that the establishment of
guidelines “is particularly troublesome in a rapidly developing area of law such as this one,
as computer search capabilities improve exponentially by the month”). Circuit Judge Bea
also noted that the courts do not have the same competitive advantage that Congress has
for establishing guidelines, perhaps implicitly suggesting that turning to the legislature is
one avenue for dealing with such a timely dilemma. See id.
166
Id. The primary reason for Judge Bea’s dissent was the fact that by issuing bright-line,
prophylactic rules, the majority opinion “short-circuits this process in an area where the
capabilities of computer software are still rapidly evolving.” Id. Furthermore, although
both the Tenth Circuit and Ninth Circuit seemingly employ similar strategies in combating
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method permits courts to evaluate different cases over time to determine
the most sensible rule at any given moment and given any new
technologies that may develop.167
All in all, the different approaches to applying the plain view
exception attempt to reconcile the needs of adequate law enforcement on
the one hand, with the expectations of privacy that are guaranteed to us
through the devices of the Fourth Amendment, on the other hand.168
Although these are indeed noble causes and should be considered in
proper Fourth Amendment analysis, the current approaches to this novel
difficulty fail to safeguard the interests of both parties involved.169 The
special approaches attempting to deal with this problem strongly favor
the individual and ultimately cripple the ability of officials to enforce the
law.170 Advocates of the closed-container analogy fail to sufficiently
defend the constitutional rights provided by the Fourth Amendment
while attempting to apply traditional values and concepts implicit in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.171 It is inevitable that the Supreme
Court will consider the issue, and when it does, it should employ an
approach that adequately balances each of the competing interests
the plain view doctrine, the majority’s issuance of bright-line rules contradicts the special
approach of the Tenth Circuit. See id. at 1018 n.3 (noting that the majority’s broad,
prophylactic guidelines “conflict with the more cautious, common law-style approach of
the Tenth Circuit, which has implicitly recognized the ‘plain view’ exception exists in [this]
context . . . but has not delineated its precise scope”).
167
Id. at 1018. Interestingly, Judge Bea actually contends that the majority opinion in
Comprehensive Drug Testing conflicts with the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Carey, at least
insofar as it attempts to establish concrete judicial guidelines. See id. It seems clear that
some of the Comprehensive Drug Testing opinion conflicts with Carey, because Carey
implicitly recognized that the plain view exception applies in computer evidence cases,
whereas Comprehensive Drug Testing explicitly contends that the plain view exception should
not apply. Id. at 998. Compare Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 998 (majority
opinion) (holding that “the government should . . . forswear use of the plain view doctrine
or any similar doctrine” (emphasis added)), with United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that satisfaction of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement
should ultimately turn on the subjective intent of the searching officials). See also United
States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that no constitutional
violation occurred where the government inadvertently discovered child pornography and
subsequently applied for an additional warrant).
168
See supra Part III (discussing the different approaches courts have created to reconcile
the competing interests in this area).
169
See supra Part III (analyzing the different approaches that courts have taken and
suggesting that each of them fails to adequately weigh and balance the competing
interests).
170
See supra Part III.B (evaluating the special approaches to the plain view doctrine as
applied to computer evidence).
171
See supra Part III.C (analyzing the closed-container approach that a series of courts
have taken to attempt to apply Fourth Amendment values to novel difficulties that arise in
the context of computer-based evidence).
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involved and mandate a course of action that appropriately safeguards
each of the various concerns.172
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Every government search or seizure of a digital, electronic, or
computer-related device poses a potential problem for law enforcement
officials.173 This Part proposes a solution that is sensitive to these
concerns while still protecting individual liberties.174 Some have argued
that in order for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to remain consistent,
courts should analyze the problems on a case-by-case basis, offering
little, if any, by means of prophylactic advice.175 Others have determined
that current Fourth Amendment principles are simply insufficient to
handle such technological advances and that a new, more specialized
body of law must emerge to efficiently handle these complex new
problems.176 Nonetheless, all are in favor of a solution that adequately
balances the interests of law enforcement officials in carrying out their
duties and responsibilities with the privacy, possessory, and
constitutional interests to which every American is entitled.177 This Note
espouses such a solution by implementing the inadvertent discovery
requirement for plain view seizures that grants latitude to law
enforcement while preventing general and pretextual searches.
Additionally, this Note outlines the proposed solution’s rationale and
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should
practical application.178
See infra Part IV (proposing a workable solution to this problem).
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the novel difficulties that digital, electronic, and
computer evidence creates); supra Part III.A–B (discussing and analyzing the differing
approaches that courts have taken to attempt to solve these complex problems).
174
See infra Part IV.A (proposing that the Supreme Court should implement the
inadvertent discovery requirement for valid plain view seizures of electronically stored and
computer-related evidence).
175
See, e.g., supra note 163 (discussing the inherent advantages to narrowing the holding
to what is essential and allowing the law to develop slowly but surely as a principle of the
common law).
176
See, e.g., supra note 148 (discussing different attempts to “update” Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and create new standards and tests of substantive law).
177
See, e.g., supra Part III.B–C (providing that those in favor of the “special approaches”
and those in favor of using analogies attempt to balance the competing interest of law
enforcement and individual citizens).
178
See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing the rationale behind implementing or retaining the
inadvertent discovery requirement for plain view seizures); infra Part IV.B.2 (applying the
proposed standard to the facts of Comprehensive Drug Testing). Further, whether this
proposal is termed “retention” or “implementation” is irrelevant to the inquiry at hand.
What is paramount is whether the discovery of evidence that is not inadvertent will render
the plain view doctrine inapplicable to justify the seizure of the evidence, notwithstanding
whether the requirement is “retained” or “implemented.”
172
173
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confront the issue directly, despite its controversial nature, because
allowing the law to remain so staunchly unsettled compromises the
interests of millions of Americans.179
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to a case factually similar
to Comprehensive Drug Testing—a case requiring direct application of the
plain view doctrine to computer-related evidence. The Supreme Court
should apply existing Fourth Amendment plain view principles while
preventing the most prominent evil of the Fourth Amendment—the
general warrant.180 The Court should remain cognizant that vast
differences exist between physical evidence and digital evidence.181
Upon recognizing this distinction, the Court could either: (1) overrule
Horton explicitly and reinstate the inadvertent discovery requirement
entirely; or (2) distinguish the case from Horton.182 However, because
complete reinstatement of the inadvertent discovery requirement would
require the Court to overrule a litany of cases that have further
developed plain view jurisprudence and is ultimately unnecessary, the
most prudent course of action is distinguishing between physical and
digital evidence.183
179
See Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court,
Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (2009) (No. 05-10067) (suggesting that police
and courts alike are not sure to what extent the judicially crafted guidelines are mandatory
or whether they should apply to other types of evidence such as cellular phones or similar
devices).
180
Cf. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The manifest purpose of this
particularity requirement was to prevent general searches,” and that “the requirement
ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit”).
181
See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the novel difficulties created by inherent differences
between physical and electronic evidence); supra Part III.A (discussing the circumstances
under which searches and seizures of electronic information are most likely to become
general and exploratory in nature—and therefore unconstitutional).
182
See supra notes 52–54, 61–62 (discussing the Coolidge and Horton decisions and the
Court’s decision to remove the inadvertent discovery requirement from plain view
analysis).
183
Overruling Horton would allow the court to reinstate the inadvertent discovery
requirement of the plain view doctrine, but would reinstate the requirement for all plain
view seizures. The Court in Horton disposed of the inadvertent discovery requirement but
never mentioned the differences in physical and digital evidence. See Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 129–30 (1990), (suggesting the inadvertent discovery requirement is not
necessary as applied to a car on the defendant’s property). Horton dealt entirely with
physical evidence, however. Id. It is markedly undisputed that the risk of general
warrants and government overreaching is far greater when dealing with computer-related
evidence. See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(finding that “[t]his pressing need of law enforcement for broad authorization to examine
electronic records . . . creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic information
will become, in effect, a general warrant” and accepting “the reality that such over-seizing
is an inherent part of the electronic search process”), revised and superseded per curiam, 621
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A. Proposed Solution: Retain the Inadvertent Discovery Requirement for
Electronically Stored Evidence
Stare decisis concerns counsel that complete abrogation of the Horton
reasoning is unnecessary. When faced with physical evidence, the
inadvertent discovery requirement may actually remain unnecessary
largely because objective criteria effectively limit the scope of a seizure.
This is not so with digital evidence. Objective characteristics such as size
limit the scope of a physical search. For instance, police cannot search
for stolen stereo equipment in small dresser drawers, a vehicle inside of
a home (except the garage), or, perhaps more illustratively, an entire
building because contraband is found in one container.184 Thus, the
objective characteristics of physical evidence help determine the scope of
the search or seizure—the scope is defined by “the object of the search
and the places in which there is probable cause to believe the object may
be found.”185 However, because an officer cannot know the contents of a
computer file until it has already been opened, these characteristics
cannot adequately guide police seizures or limit intrusions upon
Thus, although requiring inadvertent
constitutional liberties.186
discovery may not be necessary to limit plain view seizures of physical
evidence, the same cannot rightly be said of electronically stored
F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Kerr, supra note 65, at 280, 289–90 (suggesting
that physical world rules impose practically no limitations on searches of computer
evidence and “permit extraordinarily invasive government powers to go unregulated”);
Winick, supra note 14, at 80 (suggesting adamantly that general searches are far more
prevalent in the context of computer-related evidence); supra Part II.B (discussing the
difficulties of preventing general searches); supra Part III.A (analyzing the circumstances
under which searches are more likely to become general or exploratory in nature).
Nonetheless, because overruling Horton would undo and overturn much of the twenty
years of case law that have developed since its inception and because physical evidence
creates fewer problems than electronically stored evidence, overruling Horton is perhaps
unwarranted.
184
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (“Probable cause to believe that a
container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a
search of the entire cab.”).
185
Horton, 496 U.S. at 140–41 (“Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower
may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom,
probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not
justify a warrantless search of a suitcase.” (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 824)). Assuming,
arguendo, that this notion does adequately protect the constitutional interests of citizens by
guiding the efforts of law enforcement, such objective criteria are inherently absent when
courts are confronted with computer-related evidence. See Comprehensive Drug Testing III,
579 F.3d at 1004 (recognizing that law enforcement cannot know the contents of a file or
determine its relevancy to the search until the file has been opened and examined); United
States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing the same).
186
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 U.S. at 1004 (“There is no way to be sure exactly
what an electronic file contains without somehow examining its contents . . . .”).
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evidence.187
Allowing such warrantless seizures condones grave
erosions to personal liberties.
The Supreme Court should therefore declare that Horton’s alteration
of the plain view doctrine is inapplicable to computer-related evidence.
The Court should announce that the plain view doctrine, as applied to
computer-related evidence, is consistent with the view of Justice
Stewart’s opinion in Coolidge and Justice Brennan’s dissent in Horton by
ruling that
as applied to electronically stored and computer-related
evidence, the final limitation on the application of the plain
view doctrine is that the discovery of evidence in plain view
must be inadvertent.188
B. Commentary
This requirement is necessary to ensure that initially valid—and
therefore limited—seizures do not become general. Where the discovery
of evidence is anticipated—that is, where police know in advance the
location of the evidence and intend to seize it—requiring that officials
obtain a warrant imposes no cognizable inconvenience in a system that
regards warrantless searches as per se unreasonable. This rule does not
create a cost on efficient law enforcement; it is the Fourth Amendment
itself that imposes such limits on government officials. The inadvertent
discovery requirement is merely the attendant manifestation of the
Fourth Amendment’s own requirement that the items to be seized be
particularly described in a warrant. Police may not intentionally search
for and seize items not described therein. Where the government wishes
to invoke the plain view doctrine, it must show that no probable cause
for the seizure existed at the time that the particular warrant was issued.
This requirement is nothing more than a restatement of the explicit
187
According to Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, the inadvertent discovery
requirement is not actually a judicially crafted notion but rather it is a necessary incident of
the Fourth Amendment’s explicit mandates. See, e.g., Horton, 496 U.S. at 142 (Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (“In eschewing the inadvertent discovery requirement, the
majority ignores the Fourth Amendment’s express command that warrants particularly
describe not only the places to be searched, but also the things to be seized.”); Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) (“The limits on the doctrine are implicit in the
statement of its rationale.”).
188
The italicized text is the original contribution of the author and is modeled after both
the language and notion of Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion in Coolidge and Justice
Brennan’s dissenting opinion in Horton. Cf. Horton, 496 U.S. at 142 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“I remain convinced that Justice Stewart correctly articulated the plain-view doctrine in
[Coolidge].”); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 469 (“The second limitation [on application of the plain
view doctrine] is that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent.”).
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mandate of the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. It is but
a logical extension of the notion, heralded by the Court in Horton, that all
warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable absent exigent
circumstances.189
1.

The Rationale

The plain view exception to the warrant requirement primarily
operates to supplement the efforts of law enforcement officials by
allowing warrantless seizures where “the inconvenience [of procuring a
warrant] incurred by police is simply not that significant.”190 However,
where the discovery of the evidence is expected, the justification of
inconvenience is entirely baseless. The few exceptions to the warrant
requirement provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining
a warrant, such as danger to law enforcement officers or the risk of
destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a
neutral and detached magistrate. Because, however, each exception to
the warrant requirement invariably impinges on the protective purposes
of the Fourth Amendment, the exceptions have been carefully delineated
and the burden remains on those seeking to enforce the exception to
show its necessity. Without the inadvertence requirement in plain view
analysis of electronically stored information, the Fourth Amendment’s
goals of encouraging police resort to the warrant process and limiting
authorized intrusions to the smallest extent possible is substantially and
irreparably subverted.
Although requiring inadvertent discovery may appear insensitive to
the efforts of law enforcement officials, this is a misconception. The
Fourth Amendment does not deny law enforcement officials “the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence.”191 The Fourth Amendment merely requires that these
inferences be drawn by neutral and detached magistrates. Further, this
requirement remains necessary to prevent pretextual seizures of
electronic information because there is no rationale to excuse officials
from the warrant requirement when they know the location of evidence,
have probable cause to seize it, intend to seize it, and yet fail—willfully
or neglectfully—to obtain a warrant particularly describing it. The
inadvertence requirement makes planned searches and seizures without
a warrant impossible. A rule allowing seizures of items not listed on a

See Horton, 496 U.S. 128 (reinforcing the notion that warrantless searches are per se
unreasonable absent exigent circumstances).
190
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981).
191
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
189
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warrant and not inadvertently found would wholly abrogate the
particularity and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
If law enforcement officials abide by the explicit commands of the
Fourth Amendment, they should have no reason to spite this
requirement. In fact, there should be no additional burden upon law
enforcement officials whatsoever. The Fourth Amendment protects
citizens’ privacy and possessory interests by mandating that a neutral
and detached magistrate issue the warrant. The interests of law
enforcement officials in expedient investigation are de minimis when
balanced against these possessory and privacy interests explicitly
protected by the Constitution.
Where there exists no justification for excusing the warrantless
seizure, doing so would violate the constitutional requirement that
warrants particularly describe the things to be seized and that neutral
and detached magistrates make probable cause determinations. It would
ultimately “fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable
cause can justify a warrantless seizure.”192 Without a showing that law
enforcement efforts are impeded or the administration of justice is
hindered, there exists no conceivable rational basis for allowing the
warrantless seizure of electronically stored information discovered
intentionally. Where government officials are present to execute a
warrant and seize items not particularly described, it must be shown that
the officers had no intention of searching for and seizing those items.
Inconvenience to the police and a slight delay caused by preparing
papers for a magistrate are never convincing reasons to bypass the
The warrant requirement of the Fourth
warrant requirement.193
Amendment is not some mere technicality or inconvenience; it is an
explicit command of the Constitution.194 Accordingly, the police may
not—consistent with the Constitution and traditional Fourth
Amendment values—plan a plain view seizure.195
Ultimately, the sensitivity and import of the interests presented
when constitutional freedoms clash with law enforcement efforts leave
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471.
Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 706 (1948).
194
Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (“The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment is not
dead language.”). The Court also noted that the Fourth Amendment, and the warrant
requirement in particular, should remain “‘an important working part of our machinery of
government, operating as a matter of course to check the ‘well-intentioned but mistakenly
over-zealous executive officers’ who are a party of any system of law enforcement.’” Id. at
316 (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468).
195
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 144 (1990) (“A decision to invade a possessory
interest in property is too important to be left to the discretion of zealous officers ‘engaged
in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at
14)).
192
193
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attorneys relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than
appropriate in the context of a particular case. Unequivocal retention of
the inadvertent discovery requirement provides an equitable boundary
between the competing interests involved with seizures of electronically
stored evidence. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest
in allowing police wide latitude in conducting comprehensive
investigations, yet also shields the individual from overt government
intrusion upon basic constitutional liberties. Notwithstanding the
strength of the State’s interest, the government may not, consistent with
the Fourth Amendment, know in advance the location of certain
evidence and intend to seize it, relying on the plain view doctrine solely
as a pretext.
2.

Practical Application

Maintaining the inadvertent discovery requirement for plain view
seizures of electronically stored information should ultimately affect
very few cases.
It remains necessary, however, to ensure that
government searches do not become general and exploratory in nature.
For example, in the situation involving a search of a home computer for
business or personal records of a specific crime, if the government
officials inadvertently open a file that contains child pornography, the
government would still be able to seize the information and use it at a
later date. This is because the discovery of the evidence was inadvertent.
By contrast, if the government knew ahead of time of the child
pornography and had an intention to seize it, mandating that they obtain
a warrant creates no additional obstacle or inconvenience. Thus,
requiring that the discovery of evidence be inadvertent ensures that
officials do not obtain the child pornography under false pretenses or
without a warrant particularly describing the items to be seized. This
rule is sensitive to law enforcement interests in conducting expedient
investigations by allowing warrantless seizures when contraband is
inadvertently discovered, as well as to the Fourth Amendment’s explicit
commands regarding particularized warrants and probable cause
determinations.
To further illustrate the application of this concept, an application to
the facts of Comprehensive Drug Testing is illustrative.196 Instead of
proscribing the government’s use of the plain view doctrine entirely, the
Court should examine whether the seizure complied with the four

196
See Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), revised and
superseded per curiam, 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
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elements of a valid plain view seizure.197 The analysis would follow that
(1) the evidence was in plain view; (2) the investigators were in a lawful
position because they had a warrant to search for information pertaining
to the ten specified players; and (3) the incriminating nature of the
evidence was immediately apparent because it was precisely the same
evidence as what allowed them the initial search and seizure.198
However, the fourth and final element is not satisfied because the law
enforcement officials knew the location of the evidence ahead of time,
intended to seize it, and failed to procure a warrant—either through
neglect or lack of probable cause; the discovery of the evidence cannot
rightly be classified “inadvertent” and the government must return the
seized information.199 Because the government did not discover the
evidence inadvertently, it did not satisfy all of the requisite elements of a
plain view seizure and the seizure was unconstitutional.200
The government in Comprehensive Drug Testing was fully aware of
the location of the information relating to the other professional
athletes.201 In fact, after obtaining nearly all of the information contained
in the search warrant, the government “peruse[d]” the rest of the
directory in an attempt to collect as much incriminating information as
possible.202 It is precisely this type of governmental overreaching that
warrants the implementation or retention of the inadvertent discovery
requirement in the context of electronically stored evidence. Without
such a requirement, well-intentioned but often zealous law enforcement
officials would smother the constitutional rights of the citizenry.203

197
The four elements of valid plain view seizures of electronically stored evidence, as
proposed by this Note are that (1) the evidence must be in plain view, (2) the officer must
view the evidence from a lawful vantage point, (3) the illegality of the evidence must be
immediately apparent, and (4) the discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent. See supra
notes 54 & 61 (discussing the elements of the plain view doctrine as articulated in Coolidge,
and how the inadvertent discovery requirement was subsequently trimmed from the
requisite inquiry by the majority decision in Horton). Perhaps Horton might best be
understood to modify Coolidge only insofar as it applies to physical evidence. Because the
Court was not confronted with electronically stored evidence, the Court did not have to
decide that issue. See Horton, 496 U.S. at 140–42 (discussing specifically the tangible
characteristics of physical evidence that render the inadvertent discovery requirement
arguably superfluous). Thus, this Note offers a guide as to what the Court should do when
it confronts the issue at last.
198
But cf. Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d at 1005 (mandating that the
government forswear use of the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine).
199
Id. at 999–1000.
200
Id. at 997–99.
201
Id. at 999.
202
Id. at 999–1000.
203
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 143–47 (1990) (Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.
dissenting) (arguing that even as applied to physical evidence, the inadvertent discovery
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To equate patently warrantless seizures of electronically stored
information with valid plain view seizures demeans the grand
conception of the Fourth Amendment and its lofty purpose in the
historic struggle for freedom.204 The plain view exception to the warrant
requirement is a necessary incident of legitimate law enforcement efforts,
but the intentional seizure of items not particularly described is
altogether different.205 Although the interests of the state are by no
means trivial or insignificant, they compel the conclusion that these
interests cannot justify the substantial damage and erosion to
constitutional rights that inevitably result from whimsically allowing
warrantless seizures of electronically stored information.206
V. CONCLUSION
Two of the most reinforced rules of the Fourth Amendment are that
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable and warrants must be
sufficiently particularized. From these two fundamental principles flows
the assumption that police cannot seize evidence without a warrant
merely because they position themselves in a way that makes the
evidence visible. Cognizant of this, the Court in Coolidge articulated a
standard for plain view seizures when faced with physical evidence,
which the Court previously found unnecessary in Horton.207 However,

requirement is necessary to keep law enforcement officials from eroding and intruding
upon basic constitutional liberties).
204
Cf. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (“Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate
is the time-tested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.” (citing Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964))); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724 (1961) (“Historically
the struggle for freedom . . . in England was bound up with the issue of the scope of the
search and seizure power.”).
205
See Horton, 496 U.S. at 144–45 (finding that absent exigent circumstances there is no
reason to allow warrantless seizures because “[t]he rationale behind the inadvertent
discovery requirement is simply that we will not excuse officers from the general
requirement of a warrant . . . if the officers know the location of evidence, have probable
cause to seize it, intend to seize it, and yet do not bother to obtain a warrant particularly
describing that evidence”).
206
See id. at 144 (citations omitted) (“A decision to invade a possessory interest in
property is too important to be left to the discretion of zealous officers ‘engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 14 (1948))); see also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (“The framers of
the Fourth Amendment must have concluded that reasonably strict search and seizure
requirements were not too costly a price to pay for protection against the dangers incident
to invasion of private premises and papers by officers, some of whom might be
overzealous and oppressive.”).
207
See supra notes 54 & 61 (discussing the original four elements of valid plain view
seizures as articulated in Coolidge and the subsequent revision of the doctrine in Horton that
saw the tailoring of the inadvertent discovery requirement).
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considering the Court has always been wary of the “grave dangers”
inherent in authorizing a seizure of a person’s papers that are not
inherent in physical evidence searches—and has yet to consider the
Fourth Amendment’s application to electronically stored information—it
is likely the Court will find the vast differences between physical and
digital evidence significant.208
As exemplified by Comprehensive Drug Testing and similar cases, law
enforcement officials are often involved in the competitive enterprise of
“ferreting out crime” and are therefore occasioned to overzealous
tendencies. The occurrence of such evils increases greatly in the context
of electronically stored information. Requiring inadvertent discovery
should not at all hinder the efforts of law enforcement officials to obtain
the evidence necessary for conviction of crimes to which they have
probable cause. Nonetheless, this requirement remains necessary to
ensure that when the plain view doctrine is applied in the context of
electronically stored evidence, it complies with the text of the Fourth
Amendment. By permitting this exception to the warrant requirement,
courts are tolerating government officials’ direct violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Therefore, exceptions must be drawn as narrowly as
possible. It cannot be said with enough emphasis that “[i]t is the duty of
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and
against any stealthy encroachments thereon.”209
It is plausible that maintaining the inadvertent discovery
requirement for plain view seizures of electronically stored evidence will
affect relatively few police seizures. However, as Justice Bradley wisely
observed over a century ago, “illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure.”210 With this concern in mind, the Supreme
Court must establish a standard that adequately protects the privacy and
possessory interests of the individual while accommodating law
enforcement’s legitimate need for flexibility in conducting computer
searches.
Implementing or retaining the inadvertent discovery
requirement in the context of plain view seizures of electronically stored
evidence offers the most viable method for ensuring that government
seizures of electronically stored evidence do not become general or
exploratory and comply with the explicit commands of the Fourth

208
Cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976) (“We recognize that there are
grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a
person’s papers that are not necessarily present in executing a warrant to search for
physical objects.”).
209
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
210
Id.
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Amendment. This standard will neither unduly burden the efforts of
law enforcement authorities to maintain order in a civilized society nor
authorize unrestrained intrusions upon the privacy of the American
citizenry.
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